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“If one set out by design to devise a system for provoking 
intrusive post-traumatic symptoms, one could not do better 
than a court of law.”1 Judith Herman 
PRELUDE 
The scene is a small, plain courtroom: the carpeting deep 
blue, the walls a light grey.  It could be anywhere in the 
United States.  A woman sits in the witness chair, looking 
straight ahead.  She came to this country from somewhere 
else, and she is seeking political asylum. 
To her right, an immigration judge in a black robe sits at 
a raised wooden bench.  A large government seal dominates 
the wall behind her.  There are tables for the lawyers, with a 
podium between them, and several rows of empty benches 
behind a wooden railing.  An interpreter sits in a chair, a 
notepad in his lap. 
The U.S. Government’s lawyer stands at the podium, 
asking questions in a clipped monotone.  The judge listens 
intently and stares at the applicant as if she knows where 
things are going. 
“Remember that you are under oath.  Is it your testimony 
 
 1.  JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF 
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 72 (1992). 
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that police arrested you during a political demonstration in 
the capital? 
“Yes,” the applicant replies through the interpreter. 
“And you were held in jail for approximately three 
weeks?” 
“Yes,” again. 
And while you were held in jail, you were raped twice by 
guards?” 
A brief pause. “Yes.” 
“Is there anyone in the United States who can confirm 
what happened to you?” 
“No.” 
“Do you have any papers to prove you were arrested?” 
“Of course not. Why would the police give me papers? 
They do as they please.” 
“Ma’am, I am asking ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions. Please just 
answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Do you understand?” 
“I understand.” A pause. “No, I do not have any papers.” 
“In May of last year did you sign a declaration that 
explains why you are applying for asylum?” 
“Yes.” 
“Did your lawyer read that declaration to you, through an 
interpreter, before you signed it?” 
“Yes.” 
“And you swore to tell the truth?” 
“Yes.” 
“In your declaration, did you say you were held in jail for 
only one week?” 
“I . . . I’m not . . .” 
“Please answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Would you like me to read 
your declaration to you?” 
“Yes. That is what I said. One week.” 
“And in your declaration, you did not say anything about 
being raped?” 
“I did not.” 
“Can you explain why your testimony today is different 
from your declaration?” 
The woman looks abruptly at her lawyer, who remains 
expressionless. She turns back to the judge and shakes her 
head. 
“How can I explain?,” she asks. “I am telling the truth.” 
Twenty minutes later, the woman and her lawyer leave 
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the courtroom.  The judge has denied her claim for asylum 
after finding she is not credible.  An appeals court will later 
uphold the judge’s ruling, and the woman will be deported. 
INTRODUCTION 
This story is a fiction,2 but it reflects the reality often 
faced by survivors of psychological trauma when they seek 
political asylum in U.S. immigration courts.3  By design, the 
courts are adversarial. And by its nature, that adjudication 
system is biased against the stories told by trauma survivors. 
Claims for asylum are a striking example of storytelling 
in the context of law.  The applicant must prove either past 
persecution or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution.4  
To meet that burden, the applicant must testify about her5 
life before she arrived in the United States. In most cases, 
there is only one witness—the applicant—and no direct 
evidence to corroborate or contradict her story.  Thus, 
whether asylum is granted depends largely on the applicant’s 
ability to tell a “good” story; one an immigration judge deems 
to be “credible” and that fits within the statutory definition of 
a “refugee.” 
In most cases, the judge has at least two versions of the 
story: the applicant’s oral testimony, and a written 
declaration prepared by either a lawyer or community group.6  
 
 2.  Though this story is a fiction, it draws on the author’s experiences.  
Between 1995 and 1998, the author worked as a Dept. of Justice trial attorney 
with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, and represented the 
U.S. government in more than 600 asylum cases. 
 3.  See e.g., Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2007).  In Zeru, an 
asylum applicant stated on different occasions that she had been raped either 
once, twice, or three times.  Despite expert testimony proving that the applicant 
was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the First Circuit 
upheld an immigration judge’s conclusion that she was not credible. Id. at 69–
70. 
 4.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (stating that a “refugee” is eligible for 
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that an applicant has the burden of 
proof); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (defining “refugee”). 
 5.  Many applicants, of course, are men.  In the absence of an accepted 
gender neutral pronoun or a graceful way of avoiding gendered pronouns in 
every sentence, I’ve chosen to use “she” and “her” to refer to asylum applicants 
throughout this article. 
 6.  See Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting An A/Effective 
Personal Statement To Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. 
LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE 249, 255–56 (2008) (discussing the role of a 
declaration in claims for asylum). 
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The only other evidence typically consists of written 
background reports on “country conditions” prepared by the 
U.S. State Department and human rights groups.7  In most 
cases, then, the only direct evidence regarding the applicant’s 
life experience is the applicant’s story itself, told in a foreign 
courtroom and filtered through lawyers, lay representatives, 
or interpreters. 
Against this backdrop, the judge will consider the 
applicant’s declaration and testimony, and will assess the 
demeanor, candor, and responsiveness of the applicant, the 
“inherent plausibility” of the story, and whether the 
applicant’s statements are both internally consistent and 
consistent with other evidence.8  If the judge concludes the 
applicant is not credible, asylum will almost certainly be 
denied. 
But psychological trauma is common among refugees,9 
and the stories told by trauma survivors defy our expectations 
for a “credible” story.  Trauma narratives tend to be 
fragmented and disjointed, both logically and 
chronologically.10  They may be lacking in detail, and the 
story will typically change over time, even with regard to 
critical details, as the survivor begins to heal.11  None of these 
things are a reliable measure of whether a survivor is 
truthful, and yet they are the very things an immigration 
 
 7.  In determining whether an asylum applicant is credible, an 
immigration judge may consider whether the applicant’s statements are 
consistent with “reports of the Department of State on country conditions.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Similarly, applicants often submit reports from 
groups like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International.  See U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Division Training Programs, 
Burden of Proof, Standards of Proof, and Evidence 17–18, available 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-
training-programs (last visited July 2, 2015) (hereinafter “Asylum Officer 
Training”). 
 8.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (setting standards for determining the 
credibility of asylum applicants). 
 9.  Research on PTSD among refugees has found widely varying rates, 
with the prevalence of trauma ranging from 4% to 86% depending on sample 
size, country of origin, and other factors.  Hollifield, M., Warner, T.D., Lian, N., 
Krakow, B., Jenkins, J.H., Kesler, J., Stevenson, J., & Westermeyer, J., 
Measuring trauma and health status in refugees: A critical review, JOURNAL OF 
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 611–621 (2002).  See also, Elisa E. 
Bolton, PTSD in Refugees, available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/
trauma/other/ptsd-refugees.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). 
 10.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175–79. 
 11.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180. 
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judge will typically point to as evidence that an asylum 
seeker is not credible.12  Indeed, inconsistencies within and 
among various versions of an applicant’s story are by far the 
most common factor cited by immigration judges when they 
make a negative credibility finding in an asylum case.13 
In this country, core traits of the adjudication system 
compound the problem.  In contrast to procedures used by 
some governments,14 the United States subjects most asylum 
seekers to adversarial cross-examination by a government 
lawyer.15  It does so in the apparent belief that cross-
examination is an “engine” for “the discovery of truth.”16  But 
when the applicant is a trauma survivor and the only 
evidence is the applicant’s story, aggressive cross-
examination is more likely to obscure the truth than reveal it 
—especially when an applicant is not represented. 
The process also assumes that a judge with no training in 
the effects of trauma can reliably assess the credibility of a 
survivor.  Indeed, as disputes over expert testimony on rape 
trauma syndrome demonstrate, our legal system assumes 
judges and juries can reliably assess the credibility of any and 
all witnesses without the benefit of training or expert 
guidance.17  However, when the witness is a trauma survivor, 
that assumption is not true. 
Moreover, by requiring an applicant to tell her story 
 
 12.  Because immigration judges are administrative law judges, their 
factual findings are subject to the substantial evidence standard, and a 
reviewing court must uphold the judge’s determination if it is supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record.  INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  Thus, judges routinely identify for the 
record the reasons why they concluded an applicant is not credible.  For a 
detailed analysis of the review standard and suggested alternatives, see Andrew 
Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 581 (November 2013). 
 13.  See infra, text accompanying notes 85 to 99, discussing the results from 
a study of 369 decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeal. 
 14.  For a comparative analysis of the asylum adjudication systems in 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see generally 
Peter W. Billings, A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative 
Systems for Determining Asylum Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2000). 
 15.  Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court Practice 
Manual 83, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-chief-immigration-
judge-0 (last visited June 10, 2013) (hereafter “EOIR Practice Manual”). 
 16.  5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 29 (3d ed. 1940). 
 17.  See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert 
Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991 (2007). 
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repeatedly over a lengthy period and  “freezing” an early 
version in writing, the adjudication process increases the 
likelihood that a survivor will present inconsistent versions of 
her story.18  The role of lawyers and community groups 
introduces still further challenges.  If the applicant is a 
survivor, inconsistencies between an applicant’s declaration 
and oral testimony are likely to say as much about the work 
habits and writing style of the person who drafted the 
declaration as they do about the applicant’s credibility. 
This Article examines these issues from the perspective 
of scholarship on psychological trauma.  Part II summarizes 
the standard for asylum and the process by which asylum 
claims are adjudicated in the United States.  It concludes 
with the results of original research on 369 asylum decisions 
issued by federal appeals courts in 2010.  A systematic review 
of the cases demonstrates that when immigration judges 
conclude an applicant is not credible, they overwhelmingly 
rely on inconsistencies within or among the various versions 
of the applicant’s story, and especially inconsistencies 
between the testimony and declaration. 
Part III introduces a useful concept from structuralist 
narrative theory: the distinction between story and discourse, 
between the content of a story (characters and events) and 
the way the story is told.  That distinction is critical to an 
understanding of the differences between multiple versions of 
a single story (the testimony and declaration, for instance), as 
well as the effects of trauma on storytelling.  The most critical 
point is this: judges and lawyers typically assume that 
trauma impacts only the way an applicant tells her story—
the discourse—but not the content of the story itself. 
Empirical research has proven that assumption to be wrong.19 
The Article then turns directly to the challenges faced by 
survivors who seek asylum.  After explaining the symptoms of 
trauma, Part IV examines the effects of trauma on a 
survivor’s ability to tell her story and the role of storytelling 
in the recovery process.  Part V re-examines the asylum 
 
 18.  In a study of refugees who suffered from PTSD, for instance, British 
researchers found that the rate of discrepancies increased substantially when 
they told their stories twice with a delay of six to seven months.  Jane Herlihy & 
Stuart Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken 
as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE 81 (2006). 
 19.  See infra, text discussing notes 159 to 167. 
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adjudication system.  It begins by reconsidering the process 
by which immigration judges evaluate credibility, then 
explores the ways a lawyer’s handling of a case can impact an 
immigration judge’s credibility findings. 
The final section, Part VI, surveys proposals for reform, 
then recommends that the U.S. Government eliminate 
adversarial hearings for asylum seekers.  In addition, both 
judges and lawyers should be trained to understand the 
symptoms and effects of trauma, and especially the impact of 
trauma on a survivor’s ability to tell her story. 
But in some respects the scope of this Article is limited: 
there are other cultural, psychological, and practical issues 
that may affect a survivor’s testimony, ranging from feelings 
of shame or a fear of authority figures to the challenges of 
accurate interpretation.20  Though the Article does not 
consider these issues, they further support the Article’s 
central claim—that an adversarial hearing is a deeply and 
inherently flawed way to assess the credibility of asylum 
applicants who have experienced traumatic events. 
I. THE ADJUDICATION OF CREDIBILITY IN U.S. CLAIMS 
FOR ASYLUM 
In the words of a former immigration judge, the system 
by which the United States adjudicates claims for asylum is a 
“byzantine,” “crazy-quilt method” for deciding cases on which 
an applicant’s life may depend.21  This section will walk 
readers through that method and then present the results of 
original empirical research on the reasons why immigration 
judges find applicants not to be credible. 
A. The Asylum Adjudication Process 
Asylum is potentially available to any foreign national 
 
 20.  For instance, trauma survivors often feel shame, guilt, or self-loathing 
about their experiences, and survivor’s ability to discuss her experiences in the 
presence of lawyers and judges may be diminished by cultural factors, gender 
roles, a fear of authority figures, or the social repercussions of talking about a 
rape with strangers.  Herman, supra note 1, at 94; See David Gangsei & Ana C. 
Deutsch, Psychological Evaluation of Asylum Seekers as a Therapeutic Process, 
17 TORTURE 79, 80, 82 (2007). Moreover, because the goal of torturers is often to 
make their victims talk, a torture survivor may associate talking in a legal 
setting “with the experience of forced talking under torture.”  Id. at 80. 
 21.  Bruce J. Einhorn, The Gift of Understanding, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 149, 
152, 156 (2010). 
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who is physically present in the United States.22  It is also 
available to any foreign national who seeks admission at a 
port of entry if the government determines, after an 
interview, that the person has a “credible fear” of 
persecution.23  The ultimate goal of the adjudication process is 
to determine whether the applicant is a “refugee.”  The 
applicant has the burden of proof24 and must demonstrate she 
is unwilling or unable to return to her country of nationality 
or citizenship25 because of past persecution or a “well-founded 
fear” of future persecution.26  The term “persecution” is 
construed narrowly to include only serious (and usually 
physical) harm.27 
The applicant must also prove she has been (or may be) 
targeted for persecution “on account of” race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or “membership in a particular 
 
 22.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).  Refugee status may also be granted to certain 
persons who are outside the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157. 
 23.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 24.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 25.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee”).  But if the applicant is 
stateless (i.e., the applicant “has no nationality”), the assessment will focus 
instead on the country of the applicant’s “last habitual residence.” Id. 
 26.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  To establish a “well-founded fear” of 
persecution, an applicant must demonstrate that her fear is both subjectively 
genuine and objectively reasonable. See e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 
1191–92 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 27.  See, e.g., Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 1996) (two 
arrests with beatings and interrogation that the applicant did not characterize 
as “severe” or “excessive” did not establish past persecution); Thomas v. 
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that escalating 
intimidation and a serious threat of physical violence established persecution); 
Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding death 
threats along with beatings of family members and murders of political allies 
constitute persecution).  The term persecution does not include lesser forms of 
discrimination.  E.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (treatment 
of feminists in Iran was not so harsh as to amount to “persecution”).  Nor does it 
include purely economic harms unless they threatened a person’s life or 
freedom.  See, e.g., Li v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage which 
threatens a petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution).  In one case, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a Seventh Day Adventist minister had not suffered 
past persecution by being forced to serve as a porter for the Burmese military. 
Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004).  However, because a fellow 
minister had been tortured and killed, the Court concluded that the applicant 
had a well-founded fear of persecution. Id.  For a broader discussion of asylum’s 
persecution requirement, see Michael English, Distinguishing True Persecution 
from Legitimate Prosecution in American Asylum Law, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 109 
(2007). 
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social group.”28  A generalized fear of civil strife will not 
suffice,29 nor will a threat motivated by personal animosity.30  
The standard is forward-looking: while past persecution 
creates a presumption that an applicant has a well-founded 
fear of future persecution, the Government can rebut that 
presumption by showing that circumstances have changed, or 
that internal relocation is both possible and reasonable.31  But 
in extreme cases, past persecution alone may be sufficient if 
the applicant demonstrates “compelling reasons” why he or 
she is unwilling to return to the country “arising out of the 
severity of the past persecution.”32 
Certain classes of applicants are barred as a matter of 
law.  Some are excluded because the applicant was firmly 
resettled in another country33 or could safely relocate to 
another part of her own country.34  Still others are excluded 
for “bad” behavior, ranging from assistance in the persecution 
of others35 to terrorism-related activity36 to a conviction for 
certain crimes.37  But even if an applicant clears these 
hurdles, an immigration judge still has discretion to deny her 
application on other, unspecified grounds.38 
 
 28.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  Several circuits have formally adopted the 
doctrine of “mixed motives,” which recognizes that an applicant may be eligible 
for asylum if her alleged persecutors have multiple motives as long as at least 
one of the motives is among those specified in the statute.  E.g., Mohideen v. 
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 29.  E.g., Rasiah v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (“simply because 
civil strife causes substantial hardships for an ethnic minority, that does not 
automatically entitle all members of that minority to asylum”). 
 30.  E.g., Zayas-Marini v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that death threats grounded only in “personal animosity” were not grounds for 
asylum). 
 31.  8 C.F.R. 206.16(b)(1)(i). 
 32.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). 
 33.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 CFR § 208.15 (defining “firm 
resettlement”). 
 34.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 35.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)  & 1158(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 36.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). 
 37.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction for serious non-political crime); 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (conviction for aggravated felony). 
 38.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Attorney General “may” 
grant asylum to an eligible refugee); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14 (stating that an 
immigration judge “may grant or deny asylum in the exercise of discretion”).  
While immigration judges can and sometimes do deny asylum to otherwise 
eligible applicants on purely discretionary grounds, such denials are rare and 
are generally based on egregious conduct by the applicant.  See, e.g., Aioub v. 
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2008) (asylum denied because of 
01 PASKEY FINAL 5/18/2016  3:49 PM 
2016] TELLING REFUGEE STORIES 467 
To meet her burden, an applicant must tell a story about 
her life.  The context for this legal storytelling is unusual.  
The principle of res judicata is founded on the premise that a 
litigant is entitled to a single adjudication of any claim.39  But 
for asylum cases, there are two distinct systems of 
adjudication, run by separate agencies. Some applicants 
receive a non-adversarial interview; some an adversarial 
hearing.  Many claims are adjudicated twice,40 and asylum 
can be granted after either adjudication.  There is no “law of 
the case” doctrine, and the second adjudication (if there is 
one) is entirely de novo.41 
The adjudication process begins with a government 
form42 on which the applicant provides biographic 
information and summarizes the facts underlying her claim.  
Many applicants also submit a declaration presenting the 
facts in greater detail than the form allows.  The declaration 
is typically drafted by a lawyer if the applicant has one, or by 
a community group if she does not.43 
 
applicant’s fraudulent marriage); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (asylum denied because of applicant’s three drunk-driving 
convictions). 
 39.  See, e.g., Mahmood v. Research in Mot. Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d, 515 Fed. Appx. 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 40.  The exact percentage is impossible to determine: two separate federal 
agencies are involved, and there are no statistics that track individual cases 
through the complete system.  That said, the number is probably more than 20 
percent.  In fiscal year 2014, for instance, asylum offices referred roughly 50% of 
all cases to an immigration court, and 44% of the cases adjudicated by 
immigration judges that year had previously been adjudicated by an asylum 
officer.Those percentages were calculated from data separately maintained by 
the Asylum Office, see infra note 64, and the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, see infra note 71.. 
 41.  If an alien in removal proceedings expresses fear of persecution and 
files an application for asylum, the immigration judge must conduct a hearing 
and consider the application unless the alien previously filed an application that 
was referred to (and considered by) another immigration judge.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.11(c). 
 42.  See 8 CFR § 208.3.  Department of Homeland Security, I-589, 
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589.pdf (last visited 
September 26, 2014). 
 43.  Asylum applicants in removal proceedings are entitled to assistance by 
counsel of their choice at no expense to the government. 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(4)(A).  Some scholars have argued that the Government should provide 
free representation to indigent applicants.  See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 295, 384 (2007) (hereinafter 
01 PASKEY FINAL 5/18/2016  3:49 PM 
468 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Once this paperwork is ready, the process diverges.  If 
the government has initiated a removal case against the 
applicant—or if the applicant seeks asylum after a credible 
fear interview—the claim is defensive and will be adjudicated 
by an immigration judge during an adversarial hearing.44  
Other claims are affirmative, and the applicant will receive a 
non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer.45  But 
asylum officers grant just 47% of the claims they adjudicate.46  
A larger number of applicants —50% of the total—are placed 
in removal proceedings, where they receive a second, 
adversarial adjudication.  Because the adversarial hearings 
are the same for all applicants, this discussion will begin with 
an asylum interview and follow an affirmative claim through 
the process. 
Asylum officers are employees of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency in the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS).47  Most officers are not lawyers, 
but all receive extensive training.48  Asylum interviews are 
conducted under oath but are not recorded or transcribed.  
The officer’s handwritten notes are the only record of the 
applicant’s statements, and the applicant has no opportunity 
to review the notes or challenge their accuracy.49  If an 
 
“Refugee Roulette”). 
 44.  See 8 CFR 208.2(a) (delineating the respective jurisdictions of 
immigration judges and asylum officers).  See also EOIR Practice Manual at 38 
(discussing the procedural differences between affirmative and defensive 
claims). 
 45.  See 8 CFR 208.2 (outlining the respective jurisdictions of the asylum 
offices and immigration courts). 
 46.  For an explanation of the data and sources on which that figure is 
based, see infra, text accompanying notes 64 to 67 and source cited therein. 
 47.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Refugee, Asylum, and 
International Operations, available at http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
directorates-and-program-offices/refugee-asylum-and-international-operations-
directorate (last visited June 12, 2015).  Prior to the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security in 2003, most immigration functions were performed by 
employees of the Justice Department.  See generally U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Our History, available at http://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/our-history (last visited June 12, 2015). 
 48.  The training includes a 5–1/2 week course required of all USCIS 
immigration officers, and a five-week Asylum Officer Basic Training Course.  
Supervisory asylum officers receive an additional two weeks of training.  U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Division and Training 
Programs, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs (last visited June 12, 2015). 
 49.  The procedures for asylum interviews state that the record shall consist 
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applicant needs an interpreter she must provide one, and 
many use a family member or friend.50 
By design, the interviews are non-adversarial.51  Training 
materials explain that the officer is a “neutral decision-
maker” rather than an “advocate,” and that a non-adversarial 
interview allows an applicant to present her claim in “as 
unrestricted a manner as possible, within the inherent 
constraints of an interview before a government official.”52  
Officers are instructed to treat applicants with respect, to be 
“nonjudgmental and non-moralistic,” and to “create an 
atmosphere in which the applicant can freely express his or 
her claim.”53 
The applicant may bring a lawyer or another 
representative to the interview,54 but the government is not 
represented.55  The representative’s role is limited: he or she 
may ask questions about points the officer did not cover, and 
may also comment on the evidence and make a closing 
statement.56  The documentary evidence typically consists of 
background material on the applicant’s country of nationality 
or citizenship, including reports from human rights 
organizations and the Department of State.57  These 
 
of the application, other documents submitted by the applicant, comments from 
the Department of State, and “other information specific to the applicant’s 
case.”  8 C.F.R. 208.9(f).  The applicant’s statements are not ordinarily recorded: 
instead, the training for asylum officers includes a module on taking clear and 
comprehensive handwritten notes.  See generally Asylum Officer Training, 
supra note 7, Interviewing Part 2: Notetaking. 
 50.  The training for asylum officers notes that there are few limits on who 
may serve as an interpreter, and readily acknowledges the “inherent” 
challenges of working with an interpreter.  Asylum Officer Training, supra note 
7, Interviewing Part 6: Working with an Interpreter at 7–8, 12–15. 
 51.  8 CFR § 208.9(b). 
 52.  Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of 
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 6. 
 53.  Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of 
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 7–8. 
 54.  In lieu of an attorney, an applicant may be represented during the 
interview by a person accredited by the Board of Immigration Appeals, by a law 
student or law graduate not yet admitted to the bar, or by a “reputable person” 
who meets certain criteria.  See 8 CFR 292.1. 
 55.  Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of 
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 6. 
 56.  8 CFR § 208.9(d).  See also Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, 
Interviewing Part I: Overview of Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 23 
(discussing the role of a representative). 
 57.  8 CFR § 208.12 (permitting an asylum officer to consider information 
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materials are aimed at showing whether a particular category 
or class of persons has been persecuted in the country in 
question on the basis of a protected trait.58  In addition, 
applicants are required to corroborate their claim if they 
reasonably can: most cannot.59 
Two weeks after the interview, the applicant will return 
to receive the officer’s written decision in person.60  If the 
applicant is not in this country legally, the officer will either 
grant asylum or “refer” the applicant to immigration court—a 
circumspect way of saying the officer will initiate a removal 
case.61  But if the applicant has a valid legal status, the officer 
will either grant or deny asylum.62  In either situation, there 
is no appeal: an applicant’s only remedy from an adverse 
decision is to renew her claim before an immigration judge if 
the Government attempts to deport her.63 
In 2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the 27,006 claims 
they adjudicated, while 50% of were referred to immigration 
courts and 3% were denied.64  Among cases that were 
 
provided by the State Department, by certain other U.S. government offices, or 
by “other credible sources, such as international organizations, private 
voluntary agencies, news organizations, or academic institutions”). 
 58.  The documentary evidence may also address secondary issues, such as 
the possibility of internal relocation.  For instance, although Somalia has been 
plagued by clan-based civil strife since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 
1991, the U.S. Department of State has long maintained that most Somalis can 
safely relocate to a part of the country controlled by their particular clan. 
 59. See 8 CFR § 208.9(e) (requiring the asylum officer to consider evidence 
submitted by an applicant in addition to the application itself). 
 60.  See 8 CFR §§ 208.9 & 19 (requiring an asylum officer to communicate 
his or her decision to the applicant in person and in writing); U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Services, Asylum Division, Asylum Procedures Manual, § II.K.2. 
(November 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
nativedocuments/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015) (hereinafter “Asylum Procedures”). 
 61.  See 8 CFR § 208.14(c) (denial, referral, or dismissal of claims by an 
asylum officer). 
 62.  8 CFR § 208.14(c)(2). 
 63.  The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to review asylum 
decisions by an immigration judge, but not the decisions of an asylum officer. 
See 8 CFR § 1003.1(b) (delineating the Board’s appellate jurisdiction).  Federal 
courts likewise do not have jurisdiction, primarily because the officer’s decision 
is not a final agency adjudication.  See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 
1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 64.  The asylum office statistics for 2014 are compiled from four separate 
quarterly summaries on the U.S.C.I.S. web site.  All were last accessed on 
February 4, 2016.  See Asylum Office Workload January 2014, available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Pre
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“completed” but not “adjudicated,”65 4,706 were also referred 
to immigration courts, while 2,073 were closed.66  Thus, 54% 
of all asylum cases completed by asylum officers in 2014 were 
referred to an immigration court, where the applicant was 
entitled to de novo consideration of her claim.67 
Immigration court hearings are conducted by the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency 
in the Department of Justice (DOJ).68  The presiding “judge” 
is a DOJ lawyer, appointed by the Attorney General to serve 
as an administrative judge.69  In sharp contrast to an asylum 
interview, the hearings are adversarial and relatively formal. 
The court provides a professional interpreter and creates a 
formal record, which includes an audio recording of the 
hearing.70  In fiscal year 2014, 55% of respondents were 
represented,71 and the government is almost always 
 
vious%20Engagements/AffirmativeAsylum_JanuaryFebruaryMarch2014.pdf 
(first quarter); Asylum Office Workload April 2014 https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Affirmative_Asylum_-
_April_May_June_2014.pdf (second quarter); Asylum Office Workload July 2014 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20Nationa
l%20Engagements/PED_Affirmative_Asylum_July_August_September_2014.pd
f (third quarter); Asylum Office Workload October 2014 https://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED-AffirmativeAsylum-Oct-Nov-
Dec2014.pdf (fourth quarter). Hereinafter, these four documents are collectively 
referenced as “2014 Asylum Office Workload.” 
 65.  U.S.C.I.S. regards a case as being “completed” but not “adjudicated” if 
the case is referred to an immigration court without an interview; dismissed for 
failure to provide fingerprints; or closed because the applicant failed to appear 
for an interview.  See 2014 Asylum Office Workload, supra note 64. 
 66.  See 2014 Asylum Office Workload, supra note 64.  Most of these cases 
were closed because the applicant failed to appear for an interview. 
 67.  The percentage was compiled from data in the 2014 Asylum Office 
Workload, supra note 64. 
 68.  For an outline of the procedures, see generally 8 CFR § 1240.  For more 
detail on any aspect of the procedure, see the EOIR Practice Manual, which has 
a detailed index. 
 69.  8 CFR § 1001.1 (l) (defining “immigration judge” as “an attorney whom 
the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review”). 
 70.  See 8 CFR § 1240.9 (requiring a verbatim recording of the proceeding, 
including any testimony); EOIR Practice Manual, supra note 15, at 12  
(requiring that judges make a digital audio recording of hearings); § 1008.28 
(barring the use of any recording equipment in immigration court other than 
the equipment used by the judge to create the official record).  If either party 
appeals, the audio recording of the hearing will be transcribed.  See 8 CFR § 
1003.5(a) (discussing transcription of the proceedings on appeal to the BIA). 
 71.  Respondents in removal proceeding have a statutory right to counsel of 
their choice at no expense to the Government. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).  See 
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represented.72 
During removal proceedings, an immigration judge must 
first determine whether the respondent is subject to 
removal.73  If she is, she is entitled to apply for relief, which 
may include benefits other than asylum.74  Respondents who 
previously filed an affirmative asylum application are entitled 
to a de novo hearing on their claim. In addition, immigration 
judges hear defensive claims for asylum—claims first filed 
after a removal case began.  In fiscal year 2014, 44% of the 
17,997 asylum claims adjudicated by immigration judges 
were affirmative, and 56% were defensive.75  Most (but not 
all) of the affirmative claims were adjudicated twice.76 
In most cases, the judge will issue a brief oral decision at 
the end of the hearing.77  Both the applicant and the 
government have the right to appeal an adverse decision to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an administrative 
appellate body in DOJ.78  Finally, the applicant—but not the 
 
also EOIR Practice Manual 19–25 (discussing the right to representation and 
the role of counsel).  In fiscal year 2014, the immigration courts completed 
167,774 cases: of that number, 55% of the respondents were represented. 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook A2, K4 
(F2) (March 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf) (last visited July 2, 2015) 
(hereinafter “EOIR 2014 Yearbook”). 
 72.  See 8 CFR § 1240.2 (delineating the authority and duties of 
Government counsel in a removal proceeding).  The regulations continue to 
refer to “service counsel”—i.e., the counsel of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)—even though the INS no longer exists.  Since 
2003, Government counsel in removal cases have been employed by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of DHS. 
 73.  See, e.g., RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 14.21 (2015 
ed). 
 74.  The INA gives immigration judges broad authority to consider 
applications for relief from removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4).  The judge’s 
authority to grant various forms of relief are specified in other provisions of the 
INA or by regulation.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b  (cancellation of removal); 8 
C.F.R. § 245  (adjustment of status); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16  (withholding of removal 
and protection under the Convention Against Torture). 
 75.  In 2014, immigration judges granted or denied 17,997 claims, of which 
7,955 were affirmative and 10,042 were defensive. Judges granted 75% of the 
affirmative claims, but only 28% of the defensive claims. See EOIR 2014 
Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3. 
 76.  In FY 2014, 21.6% of the claims referred to immigration courts by 
asylum offices had not been adjudicated.  See 2014 Asylum Office Workload, 
supra note 64. 
 77.  See 8 CFR §§ 1240.12 & 13 (permitting immigration judges to issue an 
oral decision). In rare cases, judges will issue a written decision. 
 78.  Under EOIR regulations, any adverse decision by an immigration 
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government79—has the right to appeal an adverse BIA ruling 
to the federal Courts of Appeal. 
During an asylum hearing, the applicant’s testimony is 
the core of her case.  The applicant will be examined by her 
lawyer, or by the judge if she is unrepresented.  She will then 
be cross-examined by the government lawyer, and sometimes 
the judge as well.80  The evidentiary rules are more lenient 
and more flexible than in other courts—for instance, hearsay 
is usually admissible.81 
Beyond the testimony, the record will routinely include: 
the written application, the applicant’s declaration, and 
background materials on the applicant’s country of 
nationality or citizenship.82  In some cases, the record will 
also include an asylum officer’s handwritten notes, or 
evidence of other prior statements by the applicant.  If the 
applicant received a credible fear interview, documents from 
that interview will be part of the record. 
Much less commonly, applicants present documents or 
testimony to corroborate their claim.  When available, such 
materials typically consist of medical evidence, foreign 
government documents, the applicant’s passport, or the 
testimony of family members.  Some applicants support their 
claim with expert testimony, typically on medical issues, 
psychological issues, or political and conditions in the 
applicant’s home country. 
In the great majority of cases, however, there is no direct 
evidence to either corroborate or contradict the applicant’s 
version of events.  This is not surprising: the events took 
place in another country; the Government lacks the resources 
 
judge, other than an in absentia order of removal, may be appealed to the BIA. 
8 CFR § 1240.15. 
 79.  Because the BIA’s decision is an agency adjudication, government 
lawyers are bound to accept it.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1240(a)(1) (final orders of removal 
are subject to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 158, which provides for review 
of federal agency decisions). 
 80.  See 8 CFR § 1003.10(b) (authorizing immigration judges to “interrogate, 
examine, and cross-examine” witnesses). 
 81.  See, e.g., Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2009)  
(“in removal proceedings, hearsay is admissible so long as it’s probative and its 
use is not fundamentally unfair”). 
 82.  See, e.g., 8 CFR § 1208.11 (authorizing an immigration judge to 
consider information from the State Department, including both background 
information on country conditions and information specific to the applicant); 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.10 (permitting both sides to submit documentary evidence). 
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to investigate; and if the applicant is indeed a refugee, she 
fled her homeland in fear for her safety.  But an applicant’s 
inability to corroborate her testimony is not fatal to her claim.  
Her testimony alone may be sufficient to meet her burden of 
proof if “it is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed 
to provide a plausible and coherent account” of the essential 
facts.83 
Given this limited evidence, the applicant’s credibility is 
the linchpin of the judge’s analysis—asylum is all but certain 
to be denied to an applicant who is deemed not credible.84  
With that in mind, this Article now turns to the grounds on 
which judges typically rely when they make an adverse 
credibility finding. 
B. The Reasons Why Applicants Are Found Not Credible 
For asylum applications filed on or after May 11, 2005, 
credibility determinations are governed by statutory 
provisions enacted as part of the REAL ID Act.85  The statute 
makes clear that judges must consider “the totality of 
circumstances, and all relevant factors.”86  Relevant factors 
include: the demeanor, candor, and responsiveness of the 
applicant; the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account; 
consistency between the applicant’s written and oral 
statements; the internal consistency of each statement; and 
the consistency of the applicant’s statements with other 
evidence.87  The statute expressly provides that judges may 
consider any “inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood” without 
regard to whether the discrepancy “goes to the heart of the 
applicant’s claim or any other relevant factor.”88 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Biriiac v. Holder, 399 Fed. Appx 27, 35 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987)). 
 84.  Conversely, the fact that an applicant is credible is not enough.  For 
instance, a judge may conclude that she is telling the truth, but the harm she 
fears does not rise to the level of “persecution.” 
 85.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The same statute applies to credibility 
determinations by an asylum officer.  To a large degree the REAL ID Act simply 
codified factors immigration judges had long considered on a case-by-case basis. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Prior to the REAL ID Act, some circuits 
held that an adverse credibility finding could not be supported by “minor 
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of an applicant’s claim.”  Kaur v. 
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 
266, 299 (2002). 
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The REAL ID Act also codified a formal corroboration 
requirement, one that some courts had previously rejected. 
Under that standard, “[w]here the trier of fact determines 
that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates 
otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided 
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.”89 
Which of these factors do immigration judges rely on 
most frequently when they find an applicant is not credible? 
Because immigration hearings are administrative, it is 
possible to provide a detailed, nuanced answer to that 
question. 
As noted earlier, immigration judges are employed by 
DOJ.  On appeal to the BIA (also a component of DOJ), their 
credibility findings can be reversed only if the BIA 
determines the findings were “clearly erroneous.”90  In a 
federal court of appeals, the administrative conclusion that 
an applicant is not credible is subject to the substantial 
evidence standard.91  Thus, even before the REAL ID Act was 
enacted, federal courts required an immigration judge to 
explicitly state the factors supporting a negative credibility 
finding.92  In the words of the Ninth Circuit, an immigration 
judge must “provide specific and cogent reasons” for such 
findings,93 and that rule makes it possible to analyze the 
factors judges consider. 
In 2010, the Courts of Appeals decided over 400 cases94 
 
 89.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 90.  8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(i). 
 91.  See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 334 n. 13 
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Second Circuit uses the substantial evidence 
standard, but suggesting that the standard of review in immigration cases may 
be even more deferential). 
 92.  See, e.g., Gui v. I.N.S., 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002)  (an 
immigration judge “must have a legitimate articulable basis to question the 
petitioner’s credibility”); Secaida-Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 
2003)  (“Adverse credibility determinations based on speculation or conjecture, 
rather than on evidence in the record, are reversible.”); Ahmad v. I.N.S., 163 
F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999)  (“Credibility determinations are accorded 
substantial deference, but they must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.”) 
 93.  Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gui, 
280 F.3d at 1225). 
 94.  It should be noted that a significant percentage of asylum applicants do 
not have a lawyer during their immigration court hearing, and that many 
unrepresented applicants do not appeal an adverse decision to federal courts.  
See Refugee Roulette, supra note 43 at 325.  Nonetheless, there is no obvious 
01 PASKEY FINAL 5/18/2016  3:49 PM 
476 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
(both published and unpublished) in which they reviewed an 
immigration judge’s conclusion that an asylum applicant was 
not credible.  Of those, 369 clearly state the reasons for the 
judge’s negative credibility finding. Under a research project 
funded by the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, each of 
those decisions was reviewed, and the reasons judges gave for 
their negative credibility findings were tabulated.  The data 
are fully summarized in the Appendix, which includes eight 
separate tables. 
As detailed in Table 2, the factors relied on by judges 
were divided into three distinct groups.  The first set of 
factors consisted of internal inconsistencies in the applicant’s 
story, including inconsistent testimony during the hearing; 
inconsistencies between the applicant’s testimony and 
declaration, and inconsistencies between the testimony and 
other prior statements.  The second set involved aspects of 
the way the story was told, including the applicant’s 
demeanor and other concerns, such as whether the 
applicant’s story was deemed to be “vague” or “implausible.”  
The final set of factors includes anything external to the 
applicant’s story, including inconsistencies between the story 
and other evidence as well as an applicant’s failure to 
corroborate her claim. 
In 76% of cases, judges cited some combination of two to 
four of these factors in support of their adverse credibility 
findings.  Only sixty-four decisions (17%) cited a single factor, 
most commonly inconsistencies between the applicant’s 
testimony and either the written declaration or evidence 
external to the applicant’s story.  (See Table 8.) 
Five key points emerge from this research.  First, an 
applicant who is found to be not credible will almost certainly 
lose her case on appeal.  In a remarkable 96% of the cases, an 
appeals court affirmed the immigration judge’s negative 
credibility finding and the decision denying asylum.95  Twelve 
 
reason to believe inconsistencies within and among the applicant’s statements 
would play a lesser role in such cases.  Indeed, in one respect an unrepresented 
asylum seeker may have an advantage: if there is no written declaration, a 
judge cannot find that the applicant’s testimony and declaration are 
inconsistent. 
 95.  Of the 369 cases examined, 354 were affirmed. See Table 1, infra. In the 
remaining 15 cases, the appeals court vacated the administration decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.  In at least one case, the court 
explicitly concluded that the applicant was credible, and directed the BIA to 
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of the fifteen remands were in the Ninth Circuit, where 86% 
of cases were affirmed.  The Eleventh Circuit remanded two 
cases; the Second Circuit remanded one.  In every other 
circuit, all cases were affirmed. 
Second, immigration judges overwhelmingly expect that 
credible applicants will tell a consistent story.  Internal 
inconsistencies within and among an applicant’s written and 
oral statements are by far the dominant factor in negative 
credibility findings.  Judges relied on some combination of 
these inconsistencies in 86% of the cases—roughly seven 
cases out of every eight.96 
Third, the applicant’s ability to testify consistently with 
her declaration is critical.  In 56% of cases, the immigration 
judge’s negative credibility finding relied on inconsistencies 
between the applicant’s oral testimony and her written 
declaration.  In 47% of cases, judges relied on inconsistencies 
within the applicant’s testimony itself.  Inconsistencies 
between the testimony and other prior statements were cited 
in 28% of cases.97  In this last group of cases, the evidence of a 
prior inconsistent statement often was limited to an asylum 
officer’s notes.  In other cases, the prior statement was 
created as part of a credible fear interview. 
Fourth, judges also give significant weight to the way an 
applicant’s story is told.  Judges cited the applicant’s 
demeanor in 18% of all cases.  In 23% of all cases, judges also 
relied on other traits of the applicant’s testimony.98  Judges 
who did so frequently described the applicant’s testimony as 
“implausible,” “vague,” “lacking in detail,” “unresponsive,” or 
“evasive.”  Less frequently, judges described an applicant’s 
testimony as “confusing,” “hesitant,” “disjointed,” 
“incoherent,” or “unreliable.”99 
Finally, the presence or absence of other evidence was 
important, but much less so than inconsistencies in the 
applicant’s story.  Inconsistencies between the applicant’s 
testimony and other evidence were cited in 46% of cases, but 
 
reconsider its decision in light of that finding.  Singh v. Holder, 406 Fed. Appx. 
166, 171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 96. See Tables 2 and 3, infra. 
 97. See Table 3, infra. 
 98. See Table 7, infra. 
 99. Unpublished research notes by Brendan McCullen (undated) (on file 
with the author). 
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in 70% of those cases the judge also relied on inconsistencies 
in the applicant’s oral or written statements.  Similarly, 
judges cited the absence of corroborating evidence in 43% of 
cases, but in 85% of those cases they also relied on 
inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements.  In only 13% of 
cases did a judge conclude that an applicant who told her 
story consistently was not credible, most often because the 
testimony was inconsistent with other evidence. 
The data are subject to certain limitations.  Many asylum 
cases are not appealed to the BIA, and only a fraction of those 
cases are further appealed to the circuit courts.  Moreover, 
the federal court decisions are weighted in favor of applicants 
with a lawyer: those who are not represented are less likely to 
appeal an adverse decision. 
Nonetheless, the decisions in these cases reflect a 
cultural norm: in the United States (and elsewhere), it is 
widely assumed that consistent statements are central to 
credibility, and that a person whose story changes over time 
is not truthful.  But as discussed in detail below, when the 
person is a trauma survivor, that assumption is not true. 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF STORIES: NARRATIVE, STORY, AND 
DISCOURSE 
Before considering the research on trauma and the 
effects of trauma on the stories told by survivors, it would be 
useful to step back and consider several questions: What do 
we mean by “story”?  Why must an asylum applicant tell one?  
And what is the relationship between the “credibility” of a 
storyteller and the way the story is told?  The answers to 
those questions are useful to an understanding of the 
challenges faced by survivors who seek asylum, the criteria 
by which we judge their credibility, and the ways in which a 
declaration drafted by a lawyer will differ from an applicant’s 
testimony. 
In a typical legal trial, the parties tell competing stories 
and present other evidence, and a trier of fact must determine 
whether one story or the other is true, or whether the truth 
lies between the two.  But when there is only one story and no 
other evidence of the applicant’s experience—as there is with 
most claims for asylum—the applicant’s credibility becomes a 
proxy for the truth, even though a story that does not conform 
to our norms for a credible story may, in fact, be true.  To help 
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explain precisely why that can happen, this Article will 
explore the ways narrative theorists think about the 
structure of stories, especially the distinction between story 
and discourse—in lay terms, between the content of a story 
and the form in which it is told. 
At first blush, the idea of a “story” may seem obvious.  A 
story is simply the “telling” of something that happened, an 
account of one or more events for which there is some sort of 
change or transformation—a “before” and an “after.”100  If the 
story includes more than one event, the events will be related 
both logically and chronologically.  The events are caused or 
experienced by characters, and there are places in which the 
events take place.  But literary theorists have long recognized 
that even a simple story can be deceptively complex.  In the 
19th century, one scholar counted more than one thousand 
versions of the “Cinderella story.”101  What makes each of 
these versions the “same” story, and how do we account for 
the differences? 
In the language of structuralist narrative theory, each 
distinct telling of a story is a separate narrative text (or 
narrative)102 and each narrative can be divided into two parts: 
story and discourse.103  The demarcation between story and 
discourse has been characterized as a distinction between 
“content” and “expression,”104 or between “plot” and 
“presentation.”105 
At the level of story, a narrative text contains elements 
known as events and existents.106  The latter term includes, 
 
 100.  Some narrative theorists argue that a single event does not suffice to 
make a story.  See H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO 
NARRATIVE 15–16 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing definitions of “story”). 
 101.  Id. at 21. 
 102.  In this context, the word “text” is used broadly and may refer to stories 
that are told through a medium other than oral or written language.  A story 
told, for instance, through dance, mime, or a silent film would also be 
considered a narrative “text,” so long as it has “narrativity,” the qualities that 
distinguish a narrative from other forms of expression.  See generally, Abbott, 
supra note 92, at 1–12 (discussing the universality of narrative). 
 103.  See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 16–20; SEYMOUR CHATWIN, STORY 
AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION AND FILM 19-21 (1978). 
 104.  CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19. 
 105.  JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION  
81 (1997). Culler’s use of the word “plot” in this sense is potentially problematic: 
the same term is used in other (and sometimes conflicting) ways by other 
theorists. 
 106.  CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19, 34. 
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among other things, the characters who cause or experience 
events, the places where events happen, and various things 
that are present.107  Hamlet’s murder of his uncle Claudius is 
an event: the two men, the poisoned sword, and the court at 
Elsinore are existents. The category of events is further 
divided into actions and happenings—events caused by a 
character and those that are not.108  The rebuilding of a home 
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina is an action, the storm itself 
a happening. 
The term discourse, by contrast, refers to the way a story 
is communicated to an audience.  It consists not only of the 
medium in which the story is told (as a written text, a video, 
or a live performance), but also a myriad of traits concerning 
the style and manner of expression.  Among them: the 
perspective from which the story is told, the choice to include 
or omit various events and characters, the order and pacing of 
events, and the level of detail in which events and characters 
are described.  If a narrative includes flashbacks, those shifts 
in time are part of the discourse: events need not be 
presented in the order in which they happened. 
The distinction between narrative, story, and discourse is 
essential to convey a basic truth about storytelling: a single 
story can be told multiple ways from different perspectives in 
different media and for different purposes to different 
audiences.  Kirosawa’s landmark film Rashomon is a striking 
example.  The story’s events center on the rape of a woman 
and the killing of her samurai husband after the couple 
encounter a bandit.  During the film, the wife, the bandit, and 
the dead samurai’s spirit each tell the story in different ways, 
and each claims to be the killer.  A woodcutter who witnessed 
the events gives a fourth account, inconsistent with the 
others.109 
But even when a story is told without contradiction from 
one perspective, the discourse may vary sharply.  The events 
underlying L. Frank Baum’s The Wizard of Oz have been told 
 
 107.  CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19, 44–45. 
 108.  CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19. 
 109.  See, e.g., Wikipedia, Rashomon, available at https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Rashomon (summarizing the film’s plot) (last visited June 15, 2015); 
Roger Ebert, Rashomon, available at http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-
movie-rashomon-1950 (reviewing the film and discussing its cultural impact) 
(last visted June 15, 2015). 
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as a novel, a film, and two Broadway musicals, Wiz and 
Wicked.110  Each version is a separate narrative, in which the 
story is told through a different discourse.  As the Cinderella 
example demonstrates, the potential variations in discourse 
are all but limitless. 
Discussions of narrative theory most often focus on 
fictional narratives, but the distinction between narrative 
text, story, and discourse applies equally to nonfiction 
narratives.  For nonfiction, however, there is an additional 
trait.  As Doritt Cohn explains, a work of fiction is a non-
referential (or self-referential) narrative: the text itself 
creates the world to which it refers by referring to it, and that 
world has no existence outside the text.111  A work of 
nonfiction, on the other hand, is a referential narrative, one 
that makes reference to, and is bounded by, a world that 
exists beyond and independently from the text.112  In Cohn’s 
model, this world beyond the text is the reference. 
Cohn recognized that fictional works need not be entirely 
self-referential.  They may (and often do) refer to actual 
places, events, or characters.113  But while fiction can refer to 
the world outside the text, it does not do so exclusively, and 
references to that world are not bound to accuracy.  As a 
result, a work of nonfiction is subject to judgments about 
“truth” or “falsity,” but a work of fiction is not, and some 
narratives occupy a murky middle ground, part fiction and 
part fact.114 
But whether a narrative is “true” cannot be determined 
simply by examining the discourse.  As H. Porter Abbott has 
suggested, fiction can readily imitate fact and there is no 
textual property that can identify a narrative as a work of 
fiction.115  Instead, a narrative’s truth can be assessed only by 
 
 110.  Wikipedia, Adaptations of The Wizard of Oz, available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptations_of_The_Wizard_of_Oz (last visted 
June 15, 2015). 
 111.  See DORITT COHN, THE DISTINCTION OF FICTION 12–14 (1989). 
 112.  Id. at 14–15. 
 113.  Id. at 15. For instance, Elliot Roosevelt, the son of Franklin D. and 
Eleanor Roosevelt, wrote a series of novels casting his famous mother as a 
crime-solving detective, with titles like Murder in the Lincoln Bedroom.  Elliot 
Roosevelt, ELLIOT ROOSEVELT’S MURDER IN THE LINCOLN BEDROOM: AN 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT MYSTERY (2000). 
 114.  COHN, supra note 111 , at 15. 
 115.  See ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 149. For an excellent discussion of the 
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evaluating statements in the narrative against other 
evidence.  Complete and perfect accuracy is not possible.116 
The application of these distinctions to claims for asylum 
is straightforward and useful.  An applicant’s written 
declaration is one narrative, while her testimony is another.  
They each intend to tell the same story, but the discourse is 
different, and any discrepancy between the two raises critical 
questions.  How and why are they different?  Are the 
differences a matter of story or discourse?  To what degree has 
the applicant’s story been shaped by a lawyer’s involvement, 
or by the applicant’s physical and mental state each time the 
story was told?  And ultimately, there is this: to what 
degree—if any—do the differences tell us anything about the 
“truth” of the story or the credibility of the storyteller? 
Whether the applicant’s story is true depends on the 
relationship between the narrative and the reference—
between the events of the story and events in the world.  But 
without other evidence, how can an immigration judge verify 
the elements of the story, or determine whether the applicant 
has accurately represented what happened? 
The answer, of course, is that the judge can never know 
what truly happened.  Because the judge has no firsthand 
knowledge of the reference and no other evidence of the 
reference, the judge’s conclusions about the “truth” of the 
story must rely on the story itself and how that story is told to 
determine whether the judge believes the applicant is 
credible.  In short, the applicant’s credibility becomes a 
surrogate for the story’s truth. 
For asylum seekers, their lawyers, and others who assist 
them, the challenges presented by this situation are 
inescapable.  In the context of legal practice, storytelling is 
not optional, nor is it merely a rhetorical tactic or persuasive 
technique; it is, quite literally, required by the nature of legal 
rules.117  Both lawyers and the public think of law in terms of 
 
issues relating to narrative and truth, see id. at 145–58. 
 116.  As Abbott notes, historians and biographers must deal with an 
incomplete record, and what audiences expect from a nonfiction narrative is not 
so much the complete and literal truth as a good faith attempt to accurately 
represent the way things are (or were).  See ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 146. 
 117.  See generally Stephen Paskey, The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the 
False Dichotomy Between Stories & Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JAWLD 51 (2014). 
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rules and logic, but all governing legal rules—the rules by 
which a decision maker can confer a benefit or impose a 
penalty—have the structure of a stock story, a story in which 
the elements (characters, events, and consequences) have 
been stripped to a bare minimum and stated in general 
terms.  The “rags to riches” stories penned by Horatio Alger 
are classic examples. Though the characters and events 
change, in each of Alger’s stories a poor young boy achieves 
success through hard work and good character. 
In the same way, the legal standard for asylum is also a 
stock story, a set of logically-related elements with 
characters, events, and a change of circumstances.  To meet 
her burden of proof, the applicant must prove, among other 
things, that she left her country of nationality, and that she is 
unwilling or unable to return because of past persecution or a 
“well-founded fear” of future persecution.  She cannot do so 
except by telling a story, in which she and those who would 
persecute her are the central characters. 
But what happens to storytelling when the storyteller 
has experienced or witnessed a traumatic event?  This Article 
now turns to that question. 
III. THE IMPACT OF TRAUMA ON STORYTELLING 
As some theorists have recognized, storytelling is a 
rhetorical act: stories are told to a particular audience for a 
particular purpose.118  But immigration courts are not 
intended to be a therapeutic environment, and the goals of 
the adjudication process differ from those of therapy. 
As Schulamit Almog explains, the “poetics” of legal 
stories are different from those of trauma literature: “Law 
demands orderly, ‘closed’ stories, and has a valid reason for 
this demand.”  Legal stories are normative, and the narrative 
in judgments “does not interpret reality or contemplate 
reality; rather, it declares that a particular occurrence is 
reality.”119  But the “literature” of trauma is “indifferent” to 
 
 118.  See, e.g., James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz, Narrative as Rhetoric, in 
David Herman et al., NARRATIVE THEORY: CORE CONCEPTS & CRITICAL 
DEBATES 3, 5 (2012).  Under their definition, “[n]arrative is somebody telling 
somebody else, on some occasion, and for some purposes, that something 
happened to someone or something.” 
 119. Shulamit Almog, Healing Stories in Law and Literature, TRAUMA AND 
MEMORY: READING, HEALING AND MAKING LAW 289, 298 (Austin Sarat, Nadav 
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the needs of law: outside the courtroom, trauma narratives 
are “created first and foremost to serve its narrators, the 
trauma survivors.”120  This inherent tension between the 
needs of the law and the psychological needs of survivors lies 
at the very heart of the challenges faced by trauma survivors 
who seek asylum.  And if the system by which their stories 
are evaluated does not reliably account for this tension, the 
results can be tragic. 
Most immigration judges understand that an applicant 
who suffers from psychological trauma may have difficulty 
“telling” her story.  They know it is hard for people to talk 
about traumatic events, and that doing so may trigger painful 
memories or feelings.  But the impact of trauma on 
storytelling is deeper and far more complex.  It will certainly 
impact a survivor’s demeanor and memory, but it may also 
introduce a large degree of uncertainly, even with regard to 
the central details of the survivor’s story.  And when the 
survivor’s story is the only evidence of what happened—as it 
is in most claims for asylum—the legal consequences can be 
severe.  To understand how and why our system of asylum 
adjudication necessarily fails survivors, it is critical to explore 
the effects of trauma on storytelling in depth. 
A. The Nature and Symptoms of Trauma 
The word “trauma,” in a psychological sense, is usually 
associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but 
the meaning is broader.121  The word originally was used in 
medicine to denote “a sudden physical blow or injury.”122  
Much later, it was borrowed by psychiatry123 “to designate a 
blow to the self (and to the tissues of the mind), a shock that 
creates a psychological split or rupture, an emotional 
injury. . .”124  Psychological trauma begins with an 
 
Davidovich & Michal Alberstein eds., 2008). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  As Herman explains, “[t]here is a spectrum of traumatic disorders, 
ranging from the effects of a single overwhelming event to the more complicated 
effects of prolonged and repeated abuse.” HERMAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 122.  Almog, supra note 119, at 298. 
 123.  Serious research on trauma originated in the late 19th century with the 
study of a “disorder” among women then known as “hysteria.”  For a detailed 
discussion of the history, see Herman, supra, note 1 at 10–32. 
 124.  SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS 171 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press 2012). 
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“extraordinary” event, one that “overwhelm[s] the ordinary 
human adaptations to life.”125 Such events typically involve 
threats of death or serious bodily harm, or a “personal 
encounter with violence and death,” including the death of 
others.126  The common denominator is a feeling of “intense 
fear, helplessness, loss of control, and threat of 
annihilation.”127  As Judith Herman explains, the salient 
characteristic of the traumatic event is its power to inspire 
“helplessness and terror.”128 
While much of the study of trauma has centered on war 
veterans and survivors of child abuse or sexual abuse,129 the 
symptoms of trauma are also widespread among “forcibly 
displaced persons”—a group that includes refugees.130  
Research has shown that refugees are ten times more likely 
to suffer from PTSD than the general population in the 
countries where they’ve resettled.131  Before they were 
displaced, refugees often experienced prolonged detention, 
severe violence, torture, or the death of family, friends, or 
associates.  After displacement, they may experience 
additional risk factors for trauma, including arduous 
migration, the shock of resettlement in an unfamiliar culture, 
and stresses related to employment, finances, and their 
uncertain immigration status.132 
The general symptoms of trauma fall into three broad 
 
 125.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 126.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 127.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33 (citing N.C. Andreasen, Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder, in Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 918-24 (H.I. Kaplan 
and B.J. Sadock, eds., 4th ed. 1985). 
 128.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 129.  See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 20-32 (discussing the history of research 
on psychological trauma among war veterans and domestic abuse survivors); 
96-114 (discussing research on child sexual abuse). 
 130.  See, e.g., Farah Husain, et al., Prevalence of War-Related Mental Health 
Conditions and Association With Displacement Status in Postwar Jaffna 
District, Sri Lanka, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 522 (2011)  (finding high rates of 
PTSD and other mental health conditions among persons displaced by war in 
Sri Lanka); Andrés J. Pumariega, Eugenio Rothe, and JoAnne B. Pumariega, 
Mental Health of Immigrants and Refugees, 41 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 
581, 588 (2005)  (concluding that refugees are at high risk for depression, 
anxiety, and PTSD). 
 131.  Fazel M, et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees 
Resettled in Western Countries: A Systematic Review, 365 LANCET 1309 (2005). 
 132.  See Crumlish and O’Rourke, A Systematic Review of Treatments for 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, 198 J OF 
NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 237 (2010). 
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categories.  The first is hyperarousal: the nervous system 
“seems to go onto permanent alert, as if the danger might 
return at any moment.”133 As a result, many survivors sleep 
poorly, startle easily, and “react irritably to small 
provocations.”134  The second category of symptoms, intrusion, 
is perhaps the best known to laypersons. Survivors often 
“relive” traumatic events as though they were happening in 
the present.  The experience of traumatic events “becomes 
encoded in an abnormal form of memory, which breaks 
spontaneously into consciousness, both as flashbacks during 
waking states and traumatic nightmares during sleep.”135  
The experience of intrusion goes beyond simply remembering 
what happened: it “carries with it the emotional intensity of 
the original event,” and survivors go to great lengths to avoid 
it.136 
The third class of symptoms is known as constriction or 
numbing. Robert J. Lifton found “psychic numbing” to be 
almost universal in survivors of war and called it a “paralysis 
of the mind.”137  In contrast to intrusion, survivors are aware 
of the present, but their perceptions and responses are 
altered, and their present experience may lose the qualities of 
ordinary reality, as if events are happening to someone 
else.138  In Herman’s words, “[t]hese perceptual changes 
combine with a feeling of indifference, emotional detachment, 
and profound passivity . . .”139 
Survivors often oscillate between intrusion and numbing, 
between reliving events and experiencing nothing.140  Herman 
calls this “the dialectic of trauma,” a complicated rhythm in 
which a survivor “finds herself caught between the extremes 
of amnesia or reliving the trauma, between floods of intense, 
overwhelming feeling and arid states of no feeling at all, 
between irritable, impulsive action and complete inhibition of 
action.”141  Beyond these cardinal symptoms, traumatic 
 
 133.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 35. 
 134.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 35. 
 135.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 37. 
 136.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 42. 
 137.  Robert Jay Lifton, Beyond Psychic Numbing: A Call to Awareness, 52 
AM J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 619 (October 1982). 
 138.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43. 
 139.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43. 
 140.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43. 
 141.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 47. 
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events often have a deeper, existential impact: they can 
undermine a survivor’s belief systems, “violate the victim’s 
faith in a natural or divine order,” and “shatter the 
construction of the self that is formed and sustained in 
relation to others.”142 
B. The Impact of Trauma on a Survivor’s Story 
Stories are central to the way human beings construct a 
sense of self, and the experience of trauma has a profound 
impact on a survivor’s ability to tell her story.  Our ability to 
describe the past relies on memory, but the memories left by 
traumatic events are different from those of day-to-day living.  
In contrast to ordinary memories, traumatic memories are 
not encoded “in a verbal, linear narrative that is assimilated 
into an ongoing life story.”143  Instead, they leave an “indelible 
image,”144 whereby events are “encoded in the form of vivid 
sensations and images.”145  In other words, a survivor’s 
memory is “imprinted” with the sensory data from the 
traumatic event—the sights, sounds, smells, and bodily 
sensations—but without the linguistic narrative structure 
that gives a person’s ordinary memories a sense of logical and 
chronological coherence. 
Because stories are key to the construction of self, they 
also play a critical role in the process of healing.  Herman 
divides recovery into three distinct stages, each with a 
different task: the establishment of safety; remembrance and 
mourning; and reconnection with ordinary life.146  In 
Herman’s second stage, the survivor learns to tell her story 
completely, repeatedly, and in detail.147  A survivor suffering 
from the symptoms of trauma may begin by telling a story 
that is “repetitious, stereotyped, and emotionless.”148  If a 
survivor can tell her story at all (some cannot), the character 
of traumatic memory often results in a narrative that is 
 
 142.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 51. 
 143.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 37. 
 144.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 38 (citing ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE CONCEPT 
OF THE SURVIVOR, IN SURVIVORS, VICTIMS, AND PERPETRATORS: ESSAYS ON THE 
NAZI HOLOCAUST 113 (Joel E. Dimsdale ed. 1980)). 
 145.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 38. 
 146.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 155. 
 147.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175. 
 148.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175. 
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incomplete, incoherent, fragmented, and chronologically 
fractured.149 
Even laypersons understand that a trauma survivor may 
have difficulty telling her story.  Note the use of language 
here: the manner in which a story is told is the discourse and 
not the story itself.  Whether a person was raped once or 
three times is story: each rape is a separate event.  Whether 
the description of the events is vague, repetitious, or 
emotionless is discourse.  But the symptoms of trauma do not 
affect only the discourse: they also affect the underlying story, 
the events and characters that form the content of a 
narrative.  We assume the details of a “true” story will not 
change over time, but Herman emphasizes that this 
assumption does not hold for the stories told by survivors: 
[B]oth patient and therapist must develop tolerance for 
some degree of uncertainty, even regarding the basic facts 
of the story. In the course of recovery, the story may 
change, even as missing pieces are recovered. . . . Thus, 
both patient and therapist must accept the fact that they 
do not have a complete knowledge, and must learn to live 
with ambiguity while exploring at a tolerable pace.150 
The pace of this work is often slow, and the process of 
constructing a full and detailed account is challenging.  The 
survivor may become agitated or withdrawn; she may find it 
increasingly difficult to use words; she may suffer intrusive 
flashbacks; and to avoid the difficulties (and the pain) “[s]he 
may insist that the therapist validate a partial and 
incomplete version of events without further exploration.”151  
And because the “truth” can be difficult to face, survivors 
“often vacillate in reconstructing their stories,” and they may 
be “ambivalen[t] about truth-telling.”152 
The impact of trauma on memory and storytelling has 
been explored extensively in certain groups of trauma 
survivors.  For instance, the narratives told by Holocaust 
survivors are often described as “fractured,” “fragmented,” 
“disrupted,” or “interrupted.”153  In some instances, the 
 
 149.  See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 177; Almog, supra note 119, at 426. 
 150.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 179-80. 
 151.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180–81. 
 152.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 181. 
 153.  See, e.g., Shulamit Almog, Healing Stories in Law and Literature, in 
TRAUMA AND MEMORY: READING, HEALING, AND MAKING LAW 289, 293 (Austin 
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memories are simply too painful to recall, even after decades 
have passed.154  Among women who have been sexually 
abused, there is a tendency to revise the story over time, a 
phenomenon Kim Lane Scheppele calls “shifting stories.”155  
As Schepple explains, “abused women frequently repress 
what happened; they cannot speak; they hesitate, waver and 
procrastinate; they hope the abuse will go away; [and] they 
cover up for their abusers . . .”156  These actions “produce 
delayed or altered stories, which are then disbelieved for the 
very reason that they have been revised.”157 
The critical point—that the stories of trauma survivors 
change over time, even with regard to central details—has 
been proven by empirical research.  In a 2006 article, British 
researchers Jane Herlihy and Stuart Turner describe a 
careful study in which thirty-nine refugees from Kosovo and 
Bosnia were interviewed on two occasions about two events in 
their past, one traumatic and one non-traumatic.158  At the 
outset, the refugees were assessed for PTSD, and all 
exhibited symptoms of trauma in varying degrees.159  All 
participants had been granted refugee status in the United 
Kingdom, and they had given accounts of the traumatic 
events in the course of obtaining that status.160 
The time between the two interviews ranged from three 
to thirty-two weeks.161 During the interviews, each refugee 
was asked an identical set of questions, and was also asked to 
rate particular details as being either “central” or 
“peripheral” to their experience.  Differences between the 
interviews were noted, and researchers then calculated 
“discrepancy rates” for each refugee, with four separate 
 
Sarat, et al., eds., 2007).  For a book length discussion of oral testimonies by 
Holocaust survivors, see generally Lawrence Langer, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES: 
THE RUINS OF MEMORY (1993). 
 154.  See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 86-95 (discussing the effects of prolonged 
captivity). 
 155.  Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, 
Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 141 
(1992). 
 156.  Scheppele, supra note 155 at 126-27. 
 157.  Id. at 127. 
 158.  Jane Herlihy & Stuart Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by 
Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE 81 (2006). 
 159.   Id. at 87-88. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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calculations depending on whether the discrepancies involved 
the traumatic or non-traumatic event, and whether the 
details in question were central or peripheral.162 
The results of the research are striking.  Though the 
discrepancy rate was higher for peripheral details, the rate 
for central details was far higher than a layperson might 
expect: for traumatic events, there were discrepancies in 
roughly 30% of the central details.163  Though the authors 
give little information on the precise nature of the 
discrepancies, the descriptions they do provide suggest the 
discrepancies they found were precisely the sort of things an 
immigration judge might deem significant.  For instance, 
during his first interview one participant said he was 
“slapped around” by military police.  During the second, he 
said he was “badly beaten.”164 
The length of time between interviews was also an 
important factor: for refugees with high levels of PTSD, the 
overall discrepancy rate doubled when there was a long delay 
between interviews.165  As the authors emphasize, if 
discrepancies are used as a factor in credibility 
determinations, then asylum seekers who suffer from PTSD 
at the time of their final interview or hearing “are 
systematically more likely to be rejected the longer their 
application takes.”166  In light of those findings, Herlihy & 
Turner reach an unequivocal conclusion: “the assumption 
that discrepancies necessarily indicate a fabricated story is 
incorrect.”167 
C. The Testimony Method of Trauma Therapy 
Despite the challenges survivors face, the act of telling 
the story can be critical to a survivor’s recovery, so much so 
that a form of therapy has developed around the process.  In 
the 1980s, Chilean psychologists who worked with torture 
survivors created the “testimony method,” also known as 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 88.  Because the data are presented as a graph rather than a 
table, a more precise figure is not available. 
 164.  Herlihy & Turner, supra note 158 at 89. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Herlihy & Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum 
Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE at 90 
 167.  Id. at 89. 
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testimonial therapy.168  Subsequent research has used the 
method with Holocaust survivors,169 recent refugees in the 
United States170 and the Netherlands,171 and torture 
survivors in India.172 
Testimonial therapy is not a single procedure, but a 
practice used “in many variations and settings.”173  
Nonetheless, some features are common. The method’s 
“central project” is to create a written account of the patient’s 
experience.  In most studies, the therapy took place during six 
to twelve weekly or bi-weekly sessions.174  Therapy sessions 
are recorded and transcribed, and the resulting document is 
revised until the patient’s fragmented recollections have been 
assembled into a complete whole.175  In many studies, the 
process ended with a “delivery ritual,” in which the final 
written version of the story was signed by the patient and 
copies were given to family members or human rights 
groups.176 
A pilot study among Bosnian refugees in the United 
States illustrates the process.  In that study, the treatment 
involved six sessions of ninety minutes each.177  For each 
 
 168.  See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 182; A. Cienfuegos & C Monelli, The 
Testimony of Political Repression as a Therapeutic Instrument, 53 AM. J. OF 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 43 (1983). 
 169.  Raul D. Strous, et al., Video Testimony of Long-term Hospitalized 
Psychiatrically Ill Holocaust Survivors, 162 AM. J. OF PSYCH. 2287 (Dec. 2005). 
 170.  Stevan M. Weine, et al., Testimonial Therapy in Bosnian Refugees: A 
Pilot Study, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1720 (1998). 
 171.  Janie A. Van Dijk, et al., Testimony Therapy: Treatment Method for 
Traumatized Victims of Organized Violence, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 361 
(2003). 
 172.  Inger Agger, et al., Testimonial Therapy: A Pilot Project to Improve 
Psychological Well-Being Among Survivors of Torture in India, 19 TORTURE 204 
(2009). 
 173.  Id. at 210. 
 174.  See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721  (six sessions of 90 
minutes each); Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 363 (12 sessions); Agger, et 
al., supra note 172, at 211  (4 sessions of 90–120 minutes each). One study used 
only one or two sessions of 60 minutes each, but the authors of that study found 
no significant difference between the study participants and a control group. 
Victor Igreja, et al., Testimony Method to Ameliorate Post-Traumatic Stress 
Symptoms: Community-based Intervention with Mozambican Civil War 
Survivors, 184 THE BRITISH J. OF PSYCHIATRY 251, 252-54 (2004). 
 175.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 182. 
 176.  See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722; Van Dijk, et al., supra 
note 171, at 362. 
 177.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721. 
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survivor, testimony was not limited to traumatic events—
rather, there was a “constant emphasis upon 1) the [refugee’s] 
life history, 2) the social context of life, and 3) the sense of self 
in history and history in one’s life.”178  Once this “initial 
frame” was set, the interviewer asked “succinct, open-ended, 
and clarifying questions” about the patient’s experience, and 
provided “support and structure” to help the survivor give an 
full account of the events.179  At the end of the therapy, a 
written account was read to the survivor, who corrected 
mistakes or added details.  Two copies of the final version 
were signed, with one going to the survivor and the second to 
an oral history archive.180 
In virtually all reported studies, authors found a 
significant improvement in the psychological wellbeing of 
participants.181  When the study of Bosnian refugees began, 
for instance, all participants had been formally diagnosed 
with PTSD.182  A six-month follow-up found that 47% of the 
participants no longer suffered from PTSD, while the 
frequency and severity of symptoms in other participants 
substantially decreased.183 In explaining similar findings, the 
authors of another study emphasized that “a main 
characteristic of trauma is the inability to talk about the 
traumatic experiences without being flooded by them.”184  By 
giving survivors gradual and supportive exposure to painful 
memories, they theorized, testimonial therapy decreases the 
main symptoms—”avoidance and re-experiencing”—and helps 
survivors discuss and re-evaluate their experiences.185 
IV. THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS, REVISITED 
Trauma survivors often appear in legal proceedings, most 
frequently in cases involving rape, sexual abuse, or domestic 
 
 178.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722. 
 179.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722. 
 180.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722. 
 181.  See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722–23 (reporting a 
substantial decrease in the rates of PTSD and the frequency and severity of 
symptoms with no negative effects); Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 367 ; 
Agger, et al., supra note 172, at 204 (after therapy, all participants 
demonstrated “significant improvement” on a well-being index). 
 182.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721. 
 183.  Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722. 
 184.  Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 368. 
 185.  Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 368. 
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violence.186  And yet, in important ways, trauma is uniquely 
situated in claims for asylum.  It is uniquely situated in part 
because an applicant must prove that the persecution she 
suffered was sufficiently severe to constitute persecution, and 
the trauma itself is evidence of that fact. It is also different 
because the opposing party (the Government) rarely has 
evidence of its own.  It is not a matter of “he said / she said,” 
but simply one of “he or she said.”  And it is different because 
the balance of interests is weighed so overwhelmingly to one 
side.  For instance, in a criminal case involving rape or sexual 
abuse, a court must balance the possible harm to the alleged 
victim with the harm of a wrongful conviction.  But in an 
asylum case, the Government truly has little at stake: the 
consequences of erroneously granting asylum are de minimus. 
What this means, quite simply, is that survivors who 
seek asylum must confront challenges for which there is no 
direct precedent in the U.S. legal system.  With a focused 
understanding of both narrative theory and research on 
trauma narratives, this Article now turns to those challenges. 
A. The Challenges Faced By Survivors Who Seek Asylum 
Consider again the hypothetical case with which this 
Article began.  The applicant has testified that she was 
arrested, imprisoned, and raped.  If her testimony is true, the 
odds are extremely high that she suffers from psychological 
trauma: rape, like torture or prolonged detention, is the sort 
of event that typically results in trauma.  But the applicant 
has no evidence to corroborate her testimony, and thus her 
claim for asylum will turn almost entirely on whether the 
judge believes she is credible. 
 
 186.  A detailed discussion of legal and judicial responses to trauma in 
domestic violence cases is beyond the scope of this article.  For a general 
overview of the challenges presented by domestic violence cases and responses 
to those challenges, see, e.g., Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence 
Representation, 101 Ky. L.J. 483, 542 (2013); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED 
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2002) ; Lisa A. 
Goodman & Deborah Epstein, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-
CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE (2008).  On 
the specific issue of addressing the effects of trauma, Carolyn Copps Hartley 
has proposed various reforms grounded in principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.  Carolyn Copps Hartley, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach 
to the Trial Process in Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 410 (2003). 
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If she filed an affirmative application and has a lawyer, 
she will tell her story orally no fewer than five times over a 
period spanning more than one year.187  At a minimum, the 
applicant will tell her story when she first meets with her 
lawyer, during her asylum interview and the immigration 
court hearing, and while she and her lawyer prepare for both 
the interview hearing.  In addition, very early in the process, 
the applicant will sign a written version of her story drafted 
by the lawyer. 
In the end, a judge will consider at least two versions of 
her story: the first version, as retold in writing by a lawyer, 
and the last version, as told orally by the applicant herself.  
In the process of making a credibility finding, the judge will 
assess whether the two versions are internally consistent and 
consistent with each other, and whether the applicant’s story 
is detailed, plausible, and coherent.  A negative credibility 
finding will be fatal to the applicant’s claim, and the deck will 
be stacked against her in three distinct ways. 
First, nearly all of the criteria used to assess credibility 
are unreliable when applied to the stories told by trauma 
survivors.  As dictated by Congress, an immigration judge’s 
credibility assessment will be based on the applicant’s 
demeanor, candor, and responsiveness, as well as on the 
inherent plausibility of her story, the consistency between her 
written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each 
statement, and the consistency of her statements with other 
evidence.188  Many of these factors are a matter of discourse 
rather than story, and if the applicant is a trauma survivor, 
only the final factor—the consistency of her statements with 
other evidence—has any real bearing on the truth of her 
claim. 
As emphasized earlier, adverse credibility findings are 
frequently based on inconsistencies in the applicant’s story, 
and yet such inconsistencies are routine—and should be 
 
 187.  In fiscal year 2014, the immigration courts received 225,896 new cases 
and completed 184,322 cases.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at B1-B2.  
At the end of that year, the immigration courts had a backlog of 418,861 
pending cases.  Id. at W1.  As those figures make clear, many cases are not 
completed in a year’s time; some will take many years.  See, e.g., Zeru, 503 F.3d 
at 64 (asylum claim denied seven years after immigration court proceedings 
began, and over four years after testimony was first taken). 
 188.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
01 PASKEY FINAL 5/18/2016  3:49 PM 
2016] TELLING REFUGEE STORIES 495 
expected—when trauma survivors tell their story. Moreover, 
factors such as demeanor, vagueness, responsiveness, and 
even “plausibility” are not reliable measures of truthfulness 
when applied to trauma survivors.  In Sanga v. Gonzales, for 
instance, an asylum applicant testified that government 
soldiers came to his family’s home, shot his father, and raped 
his sister while he hid in the bathroom with his mother.  In 
the course of finding that he was not credible, the judge 
opined that it was not a “logical human response” for the 
applicant to remain hiding in the bathroom for an hour after 
the shooting had stopped.189  In fact, given the traumatic 
quality of the events described by the applicant, it was quite 
plausible for him to remain hiding for an hour or even longer. 
Second, the deck is stacked against survivors because key 
traits of the adjudication process greatly increase the chances 
a survivor will tell inconsistent versions of her story.  An 
early version will be frozen in writing, while the final version 
(her testimony) will be told in a starkly intimidating setting, 
where the applicant will be subjected to adversarial (and 
often aggressive) cross-examination.  For survivors, simply 
telling the story is emotionally challenging.  The experience of 
testifying in court can provoke intrusive symptoms, and a 
survivor’s first concern (if only subconsciously) will be to 
“manage” her testimony in a way that minimizes trauma 
symptoms, even if the result is inconsistent with earlier 
statements.190  And because government lawyers rarely have 
evidence of their own, their primary strategy will be to 
challenge the applicant’s credibility and highlight 
discrepancies— or even induce them. 
In this context, the distinction between story and 
discourse again becomes useful.  Most factors used to assess 
credibility, including demeanor and things like “vague” or 
“evasive” answers, relate to the discourse of the applicant’s 
narrative.  They are deemed relevant to credibility, but they 
have no real bearing on whether the story is true—on 
whether it accurately conveys what happened.  But 
 
 189.  Sanga v. Gonzalez, 121 Fed. App’x 841, 843 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 190.  See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180  (“In order to resolve her own doubts 
or conflicting feelings, the patent may sometimes try to reach premature closure 
on the facts of the story”); Almog, supra note 119, at 298–301 (discussing the 
tension between the demands made on narrative in the context of therapy and 
of law). 
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inconsistencies regarding the number of times an applicant 
was raped or the details of other central events are aspects of 
story rather than discourse.  There is a widespread belief that 
symptoms of trauma effect discourse but not story; that they 
have an impact on how a story is told, but not on details of 
the story itself.  But empirical research has proven that 
premise to be false: when a witness is a trauma survivor, 
inconsistencies in the witness’s story cannot be taken as 
evidence that the witness is not credible. 
And yet, in the context of asylum adjudication, 
immigration judges continue to rely on lay assumptions 
rather than proven empirical knowledge when they make 
credibility findings.  The First Circuit’s decision in Zeru v. 
Gonzales191 provides a striking example of both judicial 
chutzpah with regard to expert evidence on trauma and the 
egregious delays sometimes produced by the U.S. 
government’s byzantine system for adjudicating asylum 
claims. 
Zeru filed an affirmative application for asylum in 1995; 
after an interview, an asylum officer initiated removal 
proceedings, and she renewed her application in immigration 
court.  An immigration judge heard testimony on five 
occasions between January 1999 and March 2002.192  Her 
case was then transferred to a new judge, who held an 
additional full day of hearings before denying her application 
in December 2003.193  In 2006, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals rejected Zeru’s direct appeal and a subsequent 
motion to reopen.194  And in 2007—twelve years after her 
application was first filed—the First Circuit affirmed the 
second judge’s conclusion that Zeru was not credible, as well 
as the decisions to deny both her asylum claim and her 
motion to reopen.195 
Zeru testified she had been arrested and raped by 
Eritrean officials, and the judge’s negative credibility finding 
was based largely on Zeru’s inconsistent statements 
regarding the number of times she was raped.  During 1998 
interviews with Dr. Melissa Wattenburg, a clinical 
 
 191.  Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2007) . 
 192.  Id. at 63. 
 193.  Id. at 64–65. 
 194.  Id. at 67–68. 
 195.  See id. at 69–72. 
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psychologist who specialized in PTSD, Zeru said she was 
raped three times.  An assessment by Dr. Wattenberg 
concluded that Zeru “meets criterion for current moderate 
PTSD, and moderate depression.”196  During direct 
examination at the 2003 hearing, however, Zeru testified that 
she was raped only once, at the start of her imprisonment.  
On cross-examination, she testified that she had also been 
raped a second time, just before her release.197  Her 
statements were also inconsistent in other respects. For 
instance, in 1999, she testified that Eritrean security officers 
interrogated her for ten hours, and the encounter “terrified” 
her.  In 2003, she “described the episode as a four-hour 
interrogation, and stated that she did not take the officers’ 
warnings seriously.”198 
During the immigration court hearing and her direct 
appeal to the BIA, Zeru presented evidence that she suffered 
from PTSD, but her attorney did not assert the discrepancies 
in her story were caused by trauma.199  Her motion to reopen, 
however, was filed by a different lawyer and was replete with 
evidence to support that conclusion.  In support of her motion, 
Zeru submitted evidence that her PTSD had worsened in 
advance of her impending deportation, including a letter from 
a psychiatrist who treated her after she was admitted to a 
hospital for “depression and suicidal thoughts.”200  Three 
additional letters accompanied the motion.  In one, a 
psychiatrist explained that Zeru had flashbacks to her rapes 
and imprisonments, and used dissociation and denial to avoid 
re-experiencing trauma.  In a second, a psychologist who met 
 
 196.  Id. at 64. 
 197.  Zeru, 503 F.3d at 64. 
 198.  Id. at 70. Zeru also gave inconsistent testimony on several points that 
were irrelevant to her asylum claim, including the place where she first met a 
witness, the number of grades she completed in school, and the length of time 
she had owned a business in Eritrea.  See id.  At the time of the hearing, some 
federal circuits would have barred the judge from considering such matters as 
part of a credibility finding.  See, e.g., Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled in our circuit that minor inconsistencies that 
do not go to the heart of an applicant’s claim for asylum cannot support an 
adverse credibility determination.”).  Following enactment of the REAL ID Act, 
however, a judge is authorized to consider any inconsistency, no matter how 
remote it may be to an applicant’s claim. [FN, SUGGEST: See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2012).] 
 199.  See Zeru, 503 F.3d at 73–74. 
 200.  Id. at 67. 
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with Zeru in 2006 wrote that she was “too tearful and 
distressed” to discuss the details of her rapes.201  A third 
letter, written by a forensic psychologist, provided an 
extensive literature review regarding the symptoms of 
trauma.202  Despite that evidence, the BIA denied Zeru’s 
motion. 
The immigration judge’s negative credibility finding 
made it clear that the judge relied on ill-informed lay 
assumptions regarding the symptoms of trauma.  Without 
supporting evidence, the judge opined that “it would not be 
unusual for a victim of trauma to confuse dates or sequences 
of events, but it would be very unusual . . . to simply forget 
that an event occurred.”203  The word “forget” is deeply 
problematic here, and a reasonable judge familiar with the 
research on trauma would not make such a claim.  There are 
other reasons why a rape survivor might give differing 
accounts of the number of times she was raped, ranging from 
her psychological state at the time of her statements to a 
perceived need to “embellish” the severity of the trauma she 
suffered for certain audiences—as if being raped once isn’t 
enough.  Given that Zeru undisputedly suffered from trauma, 
the fact that she gave inconsistent statements concerning the 
number times she was raped cannot be taken as evidence that 
she was not raped at all. 
Nonetheless, the First Circuit affirmed both the negative 
credibility finding and the judge’s decision to deny asylum.  In 
doing so, the court emphasized that an immigration judge’s 
credibility findings “demand deference”204 and should not be 
reversed unless “any reasonable adjudicator” would be 
compelled to disagree.205  Because the immigration judge did 
not ignore Dr. Wattenberg’s conclusion that Zeru was 
suffering from PTSD, the First Circuit held the judge did not 
err.206  The court also affirmed the BIA’s decision to deny 
Zeru’s motion to reopen, largely on the grounds that Zeru 
 
 201.   Id. at 68. 
 202.  Id. at 67–68. 
 203.  Id. at 65. 
 204.  Id. at 69–70. 
 205.  See Zeru, 503 F.3d. at 71 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012)). 
 206.  See id. at 71. It should be noted that the court first held that Zeru had 
waived these issues by failing to raise them on direct appeal to the BIA.  The 
court then addressed them anyway, and concluded that it would have affirmed 
the negative credibility findings even if Zeru had raised the issue below. See id. 
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failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel or offer 
material evidence that was previously unavailable.207 
The First Circuit’s decision reflects a common belief that 
expert evidence related to credibility is both irrelevant and 
prejudicial.  Both state and federal courts have held that a 
party may not use expert testimony to argue that inconsistent 
statements resulted from symptoms of PTSD.  For instance, 
in Westcott v. Crinklaw, a civil rights case, the Eight Circuit 
held that “ ‘[a]n expert may not go so far as to usurp the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
determine credibility.’ “208  The court reached that conclusion 
even though the expert did not directly testify that the 
witness’s inconsistent statements were, in fact, caused by 
PTSD. Rather, the expert simply testified that the witness 
was suffering from PTSD, and that PTSD “may cause a 
person to make inaccurate, unreliable and incomplete 
statements.”209  In other words, the appeals court wrongly 
assumed that an untrained layperson is capable of accurately 
assessing the credibility of a witness under any and all 
circumstances, even when the witness is suffering from 
PTSD. 
B. The Impact of a Written Declaration 
The discrepancies in Zeru were limited to the applicant’s 
oral statements.  But in asylum cases, the routine practice of 
filing a declaration drafted by a lawyer or community group 
adds a further layer of complexity.  If the person who drafts 
the declaration is not well-informed about the effects of 
trauma and the most effective practices for working with 
survivors, that person may unwittingly increase the 
likelihood that the applicant is deemed not credible. 
To understand how a lawyer or community 
representative may make matters worse, it is useful to 
compare the procedures for testimonial therapy with the way 
most lawyers typically work with their clients.  In both 
situations, the applicant will be asked to tell her story, and a 
 
 207.  See id. at 71–72. 
 208.  Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 829 (1981)). 
 209.  Id. at 1075 (emphasis added). 
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version of her story will be reduced to writing.  The 
differences, however, are stark. 
During testimonial therapy, the therapist will typically 
meet with a client six to twelve times, for as much as ninety 
minutes at a time, over a period of many weeks.210  During 
those sessions, the therapist will begin with a detailed 
account of the client’s life before the trauma, thereby putting 
the traumatic events in a larger context, and integrating 
those events into the applicant’s full life story.  While 
discussing the traumatic events, the therapist will carefully 
probe for additional details, while being sensitive to the 
client’s emotional state.  If necessary, the therapist will back 
away from difficult moments, then probe for details again 
when the client is better able to provide them. 
All of this requires a level of attention, care, and training 
that immigration lawyers can rarely bring to their meetings 
with clients.  Private lawyers must bill for time spent with a 
client, and even lawyers who work for non-profit agencies 
have limited time for client interviews.  Very few lawyers will 
be willing or able to spend sufficient time interviewing a 
client who has experienced trauma. 
Moreover, many lawyers may feel uncomfortable with the 
emotions that can surface while interviewing a trauma 
survivor, and thus they may back away from—and never fully 
probe—the most traumatic aspects of a client’s story.  As a 
result, the written declaration may be based on an incomplete 
version of the story, one that omits critical events or other 
important details.  As Herman notes, during therapy a 
survivor “may insist that the therapist validate a partial and 
incomplete version of events without further 
exploration . . . .”211  The same thing may happen during 
meetings with a lawyer—indeed, it seems more likely to 
happen.  If it does, the odds that an applicant’s testimony will 
differ from her declaration are high.  In the British study of 
refugees who suffered from PTSD, when refugees were asked 
to describe a traumatic event twice, the discrepancy rate for 
even central details was roughly 30%, and it increased as 
 
 210.  See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721  (six sessions of ninety 
minutes each); Van Dijk et al., supra note 171, at 363  (twelve sessions); Agger, 
et al., supra note 172, at 211  (four sessions of 90–120 minutes each). 
 211.  HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180. 
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more time passed between the first and second interview.212 
The drafting of the declaration itself introduces further 
complications.  When a survivor talks about the trauma she 
experienced, her statements are likely to be both logically and 
chronologically fragmented as well as incomplete.  The 
applicant’s lawyer or representative will then try to fashion 
those statements into a coherent and chronological account of 
the events.  The danger in doing so is that the story as told by 
the lawyer may differ in important ways from the applicant’s 
testimony at trial, and a judge may believe those differences 
to be evidence of untruthfulness.  Once again, narrative 
theory is a useful tool for understanding the nature of the 
challenge. 
When an applicant testifies at a hearing, both the story 
and the discourse are the work of the applicant.  A lawyer can 
shape the testimony through her questions, but in the end the 
applicant will not only supply the characters and events, but 
will also determine how the story is told.  The process of 
drafting a written declaration is quite different: while the 
applicant still supplies the story, the discourse is almost 
entirely the work of the person who drafts the declaration.  
That person, and not the applicant, will decided how much 
detail to include, whether certain things should be omitted 
entirely, what words should be used, and in what order the 
events will be presented. 
Both before and during trial, a trauma survivor may have 
difficulty telling a coherent, well-ordered, chronological story.  
Instead, her testimony may be fragmented, disjointed, and 
out of sequence, and she may omit important details in an 
effort to manage the symptoms of trauma and avoid intrusive 
flashbacks.  And yet when drafting the declaration, a 
competent, well-meaning lawyer or representative may 
reshape an applicant’s story with the aim of telling the story 
in a way that conforms to a judge’s expectations.  In doing so, 
the drafter may literally create a declaration that goes beyond 
an applicant’s ability to testify, and thereby increase the 
chances that an immigration judge will find an applicant’s 
testimony to be inconsistent with her declaration. 
The challenges faced by the applicant are further 
 
 212.  See Herlihy & Turner, supra note 158, at 88–89.  Because the data are 
presented as a graph rather than a table, a more precise figure is not available. 
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compounded by the context in which the hearing takes place.  
The immigration courts face an enormous, multi-year 
backlog, and the typical judge completes 144 asylum claims 
each year in the course of completing nearly 1,000 removal 
cases—an average of roughly nineteen or twenty completed 
cases a week.213  Professor Stacy Caplow has succinctly 
explained the practical consequences of this caseload: 
Most [judges] are intelligent, patient, and respectful under 
quite stressful conditions.  They listen to people tell tales 
of difficult lives, sacrifices, fears, and hopes, hour after 
hour, day after day.  This repetition and volume has an 
inevitable, inuring effect on their attitudes.  While they 
must be objective, they also are listening carefully for 
inconsistencies, mistakes, or inaccuracies, in other words, 
a reason to deny relief.214 
Caplow also notes that judges “sometimes even seem to 
be trying to trap or trip up the applicant, or they may be 
aggressive in their questioning and probing.”215  The truth of 
that point is even greater for government lawyers, whose 
cross-examination of asylum applicants is often aggressive 
and ultimately intended to “trip up” the applicant by 
highlighting—or even inducing—inconsistencies in the 
applicant’s story.216 
The combative, free-swinging style of many government 
lawyers was evident in a research study in which trained 
observers watched and reported on immigration court 
hearings.217  Though some government lawyers conducted 
cross-examination in a way that was “professional, respectful, 
 
 213.  The average number of cases per judge is not published and must be 
calculated from other data.  On June 15, 2015, the website of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review listed 253 immigration judges nationwide.  See 
EOIR Immigration Court listing, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last visited June 15, 
2015).  Collectively, those judges completed 248,078 cases in fiscal year 2014, of 
which 36,614 were asylum cases.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at A2, 
K4.  Thus, the average immigration judge completed 981 cases during that year, 
of which 144 were asylum cases.  It should be noted that not every completed 
asylum case requires a full hearing: some 7,306 asylum claims were 
“withdrawn” or “abandoned.” See id. at K4. 
 214.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 263. 
 215.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 263. 
 216.  See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United 
States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured 
Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L.  & SOC. CHANGE 493 (1992/93). 
 217.  See id. at 433. 
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and efficient,” others engaged in lengthy, aggressive cross-
examinations that often focused more on the respondent’s 
character than the merits of the case.  Observers noted that 
the manner of these attorneys was often “hostile, sarcastic, or 
disbelieving.”218 At times, government lawyers attempted to 
block applicants from explaining their answers, and their 
tactics seemed to have no purpose other than portraying the 
applicant as “evasive.”219 
In the face of such tactics, it is hardly surprising that a 
trauma survivor might give testimony inconsistent with the 
story she told many months earlier in the relative safety of 
meetings with a lawyer or representative.  As the research on 
asylum cases demonstrates, the most common form of 
inconsistency—one relied on by judges in 57% of cases—is an 
inconsistency between the applicant’s testimony and the 
written declaration.  Thus, the process by which a declaration 
is drafted is critical, and this Article now turns to that topic, 
with a detailed account from one asylum clinic as an 
exemplary example of how that work might be done most 
effectively. 
C. The Challenges of Drafting An Effective Declaration 
An asylum declaration is simply a detailed account of the 
applicant’s story, a written statement of the facts underlying 
her claim.  There are books and articles advising what a 
lawyer should do when drafting one, almost all of which focus 
on the end product; on the final document itself and not the 
often “messy” process by which a declaration is drafted.220  
But Professor Stacy Caplow, director of the asylum clinic at 
Brooklyn Law School, has written a superb account of the 
process her students follow.221  The work of those students is 
exemplary, and a review of Caplow’s account underscores the 
ways in which a lawyer can unwittingly impede (or even 
torpedo) a trauma survivor’s chances for success, by 
“overwriting” the declaration, failing to probe for difficult 
details, or failing to spend sufficient time with an applicant to 
 
 218.  Id. at 493. 
 219.  Id. at 493. 
 220.  See, e.g., REGINA GERMAN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 353 (Am. 
Immigration Lawyer’s Assoc. 4th ed. 2005); ROBERT JOBE, ET AL., WINNING 
ASYLUM CASES §§ 13–19 (Immigrant Legal Resource Center 2004). 
 221.  See Caplow, supra note 6. 
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fully develop the applicant’s story. 
For Caplow and her students, the declaration is the 
“central evidence” in the case, and the factfinder’s “first 
exposure to the heart of the claim.”222  The declaration 
“previews the facts, establishes the case theory, introduces 
the client, and sets the stage” for the hearing.223  The ultimate 
goal, as Caplow describes it, is to “translate facts” into a 
“riveting narrative”—“a story that compels the desired 
result.”224  Students are taught to strive for a “comprehensive, 
creative, and painstakingly detailed document that delicately 
balances case theory and the client’s voice but also tells a 
story of courage, suffering, loss, sacrifice, and exile.”225  And 
in doing so, they seek to “empower” the applicant to testify 
“confidently and believably” during a later interview or 
hearing.226 
The underlying facts—the characters and events that 
form the story—must be elicited from the client, and Caplow 
describes the process of doing so as “messy, arduous, and 
lengthy.”227  Students conduct multiple interviews over a 
period of weeks or months, in which they typically follow a 
“rough chronology” of the client’s life, from background 
information through the central facts underlying the claim 
and the client’s ultimate flight from her country of nationality 
to the United States.228  Students ask open-ended questions, 
and many clients first tell their story in a “burst of 
information” in which they “gallop through years of 
troubles.”229  In doing so, clients tend to “omit details, go off 
on tangents, and drift between time frames.”230  In Caplow’s 
words, the “process usually resembles a looping 
conversation,” a process of moving forward then circling back 
to verify, elaborate, and explain.231  The process requires 
persistence, and a willingness to push the client. As one client 
told Caplow’s students: “You are asking me about things I 
 
 222.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 249. 
 223.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 249. 
 224.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 252, 258. 
 225.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 256–57. 
 226.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 257. 
 227.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 257. 
 228.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 272. 
 229.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 266. 
 230.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 266. 
 231.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 272–73. 
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have been trying to forget.”232 
For Caplow’s students, the work is ultimately a process of 
“trust-building between lawyer and client that slowly yields 
more nuanced and specific information.”  And—just as 
critically—it is a process of “case-building during which the 
client’s memory, confidence, and eloquence improve and grow 
so that by the time the hearing occurs, he or she truly 
understands” what must be articulated and explained.233  It is 
also a “cycle of rehearsals,” in which the applicant “is 
transformed into a more comfortable storyteller before an 
audience other than sympathetic law students.”234 
This Article quotes Caplow at length for two distinct 
reasons.  First, the exemplary process she describes is one 
that rarely happens outside the setting of a law school asylum 
clinic.  Lawyers in private practice must charge for their time, 
and even lawyers who work for a non-profit agency are 
constrained by budgets and caseloads.  As a result, outside 
the context of an asylum clinic, few if any immigration 
lawyers are able to give an asylum applicant the time and 
attention the applicant would receive from Caplow’s students.  
The same is undoubtedly true for the community groups that 
assist unrepresented applicants.  And yet, if the client is a 
trauma survivor, a lawyer or representative who does 
anything less than Caplow’s students is unlikely to elicit the 
full details of the survivor’s story, and thus the applicant is 
more likely to face a negative credibility finding and the 
denial of asylum. 
Beyond that truth, the work of Caplow’s students is 
remarkable because it very closely resembles the process of 
testimonial therapy.  The similarities are striking: among 
other things, students meet with their client multiple times 
over a period of weeks or months; they work to build trust; 
and they put the core of the applicant’s claim into the broader 
context of the client’s life.235  They also probe for details and 
fill in gaps until they obtain a complete account of the client’s 
story.  And the end “product” of that process—just as in 
testimonial therapy—is a thorough written account of the 
 
 232.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 266. 
 233.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 265. 
 234.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 265. 
 235.  See supra, text accompanying notes 161 to 178 for a detailed discussion 
of testimonial therapy. 
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client’s story, one signed by the client and shared with others. 
Caplow’s students are not therapists, but it is not an 
exaggeration to suggest that their work with a client may be 
no less therapeutic than the work performed by a trained 
counselor during testimonial therapy.  This observation is 
consistent with the experience of mental health professionals 
who work with torture survivors.  In an article on the 
therapeutic effects of evaluating asylum seekers, two such 
professionals emphasize that “the process of organizing the 
torture story into a coherent narrative” has specific 
therapeutic benefits that will help a survivor gain asylum.236  
In their words, “[t]he [evaluation] process can empower the 
survivor to testify in court and to cope with the anxiety and 
stress of the asylum process.”237  And because all of this 
happens before the client’s story is committed to writing and 
filed with the asylum office or the court, the chances that the 
client’s testimony will be inconsistent with the declaration 
are greatly reduced. 
But the process of eliciting facts from an applicant is 
simply the background for drafting an affidavit: in the 
language of narrative theory, the process is focused on the 
story.  The drafter must then craft the discourse, must still 
shape the raw material of the story into a narrative text.  And 
it is here, too, that Caplow’s clinical students excel in ways 
that may not be common among practicing immigration 
lawyers. 
At various points, Caplow describes the ideal declaration 
as one that is “consistent,” “detailed,” plausible,” and 
“coherent”238—precisely the same adjectives immigration 
judges often use when they speak of the testimony needed to 
establish an applicant’s claim without the benefit of 
corroborating evidence.239  Caplow’s students are encouraged 
“to give texture and vitality to their client’s voice,” but they 
are also cautioned about the dangers of going too far.  Many 
 
 236.  Gangsei & Deutsch, supra note 20, at 83–84. 
 237.  Gangsei & Deutsch, supra note 20, at 84. 
 238.  See Caplow, supra note 6, at 252 (“The facts need to be detailed, 
plausible, and consistent . . . .”), 265 (an attorney should prepare a “coherent 
and moving client narrative”). 
 239.  In reviewing the decisions of immigration judges, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has long used these words.  See, e.g., In re S–M–J–, 21 
I&N Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997); Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 
1989); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). 
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applicants tell their stories in language that is “colorless and 
repetitious,” and it can be tempting for a lawyer to “embellish 
and overstate facts”—for instance, by substituting “torture” 
when the client said “hurt.”240  Students are taught that 
“[a]uthenticity is critical,” and that “[l]anguage, phrasing, and 
imagery unsuitable to the education, articulation and 
imagination of the client might have a devastating impact” on 
the client’s credibility by creating the impression that the 
declaration was “the product of lawyer manipulation.”241  And 
while Caplow’s students are taught to draft a detailed 
declaration,242 they are also cautioned about the potential 
dangers of too much detail.  As Caplow notes, “[t]here is a 
concern that the [declaration] not be so detailed as to risk 
possible inconsistencies when the affiant relates the facts 
under the pressure of oral testimony.”243 
Obviously, an immigration judge must still point to 
specific inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and 
declaration to support a negative credibility finding.  
Nonetheless, a lawyer who is less cautious than Caplow’s 
students and not attuned to the challenges faced by trauma 
survivors can easily draft a declaration that is too detailed, 
and too much in the voice of a lawyer—so much so that the 
declaration goes beyond the client’s ability to testify.  And as 
Caplow recognizes, a lawyer who does so may create the 
impression that the testimony and declaration are 
inconsistent, and thereby increase the likelihood that a judge 
will find the applicant not credible. 
V. STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 
In recent decades, federal courts, legal scholars, and 
immigration advocates have harshly criticized the asylum 
adjudication process and the immigration court system more 
broadly.  The Seventh Circuit has been a particularly harsh 
critic. In Niam v. Ashcroft, for instance, one panel declared 
“the elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of 
logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board [of 
 
 240.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 283. 
 241.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 283–84. 
 242.  See Caplow, supra note 6, at 280–81. 
 243.  Caplow, supra note 6, at 257 n.32. 
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Immigration Appeals] in this as in other cases.”244  This 
chorus of criticism has been accompanied by numerous 
proposals for reform.  Some are far-reaching while others are 
modest; but with one notable exception, none would 
effectively address the challenges faced by trauma survivors 
who seek asylum. 
A. The Scope of Reform Proposals 
The most comprehensive proposal follows from an 
exhaustive study of asylum cases published in 2007 under the 
title Refugee Roulette.  In that study, the authors found 
widespread and troubling inconsistencies in the percentage of 
applications granted or denied by individual immigration 
judges, even when judges heard cases in the same city with 
applicants from the same countries.245  For instance, two 
immigration judges in Miami granted asylum to 5% and 6% of 
applicants from Colombia, while two different judges in 
Miami granted asylum in 77% and 88% of such cases.246  The 
study also found widespread inconsistencies among decisions 
by individual asylum officers, and in the results of appeals to 
both the BIA and the federal circuit courts.247 
Eight years have passed since Refugee Roulette was 
published, but recent immigration court statistics suggest 
widespread problems persist.  In fiscal year 2014, 
immigration court judges granted 49% of the 17,997 asylum 
claims that received a full adjudication.248  However, the 
grant rate varied sharply depending on a claim’s procedural 
posture: judges granted 75% of affirmative claims, compared 
to just 28% of defensive claims.249  In other words, claims 
previously adjudicated (but not granted) by an asylum officer 
were nearly three times more likely to be granted by an 
immigration judge than claims first filed with the 
 
 244.  Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 245.  See generally Refugee Roulette, supra note 43. 
 246.  Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 338. The mean grant rate for 
Colombian cases among Miami’s 22 judges was 30%. See id. Notably, each judge 
in Miami heard at least 162 Columbian cases during the period under study 
(most heard more than 300), and cases were assigned to judges randomly. See 
id. 
 247.  See Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 372-74. 
 248.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2. 
 249.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3. 
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immigration court.250 
The disparities between courts in different cities were 
equally stark.  In El Paso, Texas, judges adjudicated 120 
claims and granted none.  In Atlanta, judges granted two 
claims out of 137. Grant rates were also low in Cleveland 
(18%); Detroit (14%); Las Vegas (7%); and New Orleans 
(16%).251 At the opposite end of the spectrum, judges in New 
York City granted 84% of the claims they adjudicated.252  The 
grant rate was also higher than average in Arlington, 
Virginia (71%); Honolulu (74%); Philadelphia (59%); and San 
Francisco (59%).253 
The source for these figures—EOIR’s Statistical 
Yearbook—does not break down the grant rates by the 
applicant’s country of origin within each court.  Thus, direct 
comparisons to the discrepancies found by the authors of 
Refugee Roulette are not possible without more data.  
Nonetheless, the EOIR data compel the conclusion that 
troubling disparities remain. 
Despite these disparities, the authors of Refugee Roulette 
do not question the wisdom of adjudicating asylum cases in 
an adversarial hearing, nor do they recommend streamlining 
the existing two-track system of asylum interviews and 
 
 250.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3.  This gap has grown wider 
in recent years: between fiscal years 2010 and 2014, the grant rate for 
affirmative claims climbed steadily from 61% to 75%, while the grant rate for 
defensive claims declined from 34% to 28%. See id.  But the disparity between 
affirmative and defensive claims is more stark than these numbers suggest: in 
2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the affirmative claims they adjudicated, 
while referring roughly 50% to the immigration courts.  See supra, note 63. 
Because cases referred by the asylum office in one year may not be completed by 
an immigration court until the following year (or several years later), and some 
affirmative claims received by the immigration courts are not adjudicated, it is 
not possible to calculate a precise overall grant rate for affirmative claims.  
Nonetheless, for affirmative claims that are fully adjudicated, the grant number 
is certainly more than 80% and probably near 90%. 
 251.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2.  Grant rates were also low 
at various immigration detention centers, see id., but because the demographics 
of persons held in those centers differ from the demographics of other courts, 
they are not included here.  In particular, many cases adjudicated at detention 
centers involve persons who are barred from asylum because they have been 
convicted of any aggravated felony. 
 252.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2.  The disparity between New 
York City and the rest of the nation is striking.  Judges there adjudicated 5,750 
claims, which amounts to 32% of all claims adjudicated nationwide. And yet 
those judges granted 55% of all claims granted nationwide. See id. 
 253.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2. 
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immigration court hearings.  Instead, the Refugee Roulette 
authors recommend comprehensive and hugely expensive 
reforms to the immigration court system, including a 
substantial increase in the resources available to immigration 
courts (more judges and clerks, better interpretation) as well 
as court-appointed and publicly-funded lawyers for indigent 
applicants.254  They also recommend that immigration courts 
should “be insulated from politics” by making them 
independent from the Department of Justice,255 that hiring 
standards for judges should be “more rigorous,”256 and that 
asylum officers and judges should receive better training.257 
With the exception of improved training, none of these 
changes would directly impact the concerns detailed in this 
Article.  That aside, the recommendations of these scholars 
are impractical: given the federal government’s finances and 
the position of many conservative lawmakers on immigration 
reform, their plea for a huge increase in resources is 
politically unviable, both now and in the foreseeable future. 
Other scholars, most notably Professor Stephen 
Legomsky, have called for a broad restructuring of the 
process by which immigration cases are adjudicated.258  
Professor  Legomsky’s plan would attempt to insulate the 
immigration courts from political and budgetary pressures by 
converting immigration judges to administrative law judges 
housed in an independent executive branch tribunal, and 
would also establish an Article III immigration appellate 
court.259  On the other hand, both the National Association of 
Immigration Judges and the ABA propose to convert the 
immigration court system into an Article I court.260  
Meanwhile, Bruce Einhorn, a former immigration judge, has 
called for the creation of a new “U.S. Asylum Court” whose 
 
 254.  Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 383–84. 
 255.  Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 387. 
 256.  Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 380. 
 257.  Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 381. 
 258.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010). 
 259.  Id. at 1686. 
 260.  See Executive Office for Immigration Review: Oversight Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10 (2010) (statement of Hon. 
Dana Leigh Marks, President, National Association of Immigration Judges); 
ABA Comm’n On Immigr., Reforming The Immigration System § 6–35 (2010). 
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judges would consider only claims for asylum.261 
Still other critics have proposed modest reforms aimed 
directly at credibility.  For instance, Professor Ilene Durst 
recommends that applicants should be given “the benefit of 
the doubt,” and that courts should adopt a “presumption of 
credibility” that could be rebutted only by “clear and 
convincing evidence of material misrepresentations or other 
material distortions.”262  Professor Michael Kagan rejects that 
approach and proposes instead that courts should adopt a 
standard used by the UNHCR, one that relies on whether a 
claim is “coherent and plausible,” does not contradict 
“generally known facts,” and is “on balance, capable of being 
believed.”263  Under that standard, an applicant would 
ultimately be found credible if there is any “reasonable basis” 
for believing the applicant’s claim.264 
But none of these proposals gets to the heart of the 
problem presented here: a decision-maker cannot assume an 
applicant suffering from trauma will tell their story 
consistently, even with regard to critical details, and 
especially not when subjected to adversarial cross-
examination.265  Remarkably, virtually all commentators 
 
 261.  Einhorn, supra note 21, at 161. 
 262.  Ilene Durst, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference 
to the Refugee’s Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 127, 127–28, 131 (2000).  Durst 
fails to explain precisely what she means by “material misrepresentations or 
other material distortions,” or how a court would decide whether that standard 
has been met.  A student note likewise recommends a presumption of 
credibility, but only for women who claim to have been raped or sexually 
assaulted.  Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s 
Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673 
(2007). 
 263.  Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective 
Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEORGETOWN IMM. 
L. J. 367, 381–82 (2003). 
 264.  Id. at 403.  Arguably, this “reasonable basis” approach is simply a 
presumption of credibility cloaked in a different name. 
 265.  One student note does recommend replacing the existing system with 
various procedures borrowed from alternative dispute resolution, including 
early neutral evaluation before a non-adversarial hearing as well as mandatory 
mediation in any case appealed to the federal courts.  Daniel Forman, Note, 
Improving Asylum Seeker Credibility Determinations: Introducing Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution Techniques into the Process, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
207, 232–39 (2008).  However, the proposed process would include multiple 
interviews with the applicant, and the final decision-maker would have access 
to a written record of the applicant’s prior statements to help assess the 
applicant’s credibility.  Id. at 235–36. 
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seem to accept that an adversarial hearing is a fair, accurate, 
and efficient way to adjudicate asylum claims—even though 
some countries (Australia and Canada, for instance) use a 
process that is at least partially non-adversarial,266 and the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees officially takes no 
position on which approach is preferable.267 
One scholar—Professor Won Kidane—has argued directly 
and in detail that the United States should adopt a non-
adversarial adjudication system for all immigration cases, 
including asylum claims.268  In doing so, he divides the 
advantages of a non-adversarial system into four categories. 
First, Professor Kidane emphasizes that the current 
system is enormously wasteful.  For each full-time 
immigration judge, there are four full-time lawyers who 
represent the Government in cases heard by that judge, 
including appeals.269  Professor Kidane surmises that these 
lawyers add little to the accuracy of adjudications, at least in 
asylum cases.  In most such cases, the role of government 
lawyers is limited to the adversarial cross-examination of the 
applicant and delivery of a short closing statement.270 
Second, Professor Kidane emphasizes that the accuracy 
of immigration decision-making would be improved if money 
now spent on Government lawyers were spent instead on 
adding more judges.  Beyond the obvious fact that judges 
would have more time to consider each case, Professor Kidane 
emphasizes that judges would be free to make decisions 
without the burden of Government lawyers who, in his words, 
 
 266.  The procedures followed in other countries are too complex to merit 
discussion here, but Prof. Peter Billings has analyzed the systems of four 
common law countries in detail, and he ultimately concludes that the goals of 
asylum adjudication would best be served by “a broadly inquisitorial [i.e., non-
adversarial] approach” at the trial level.  Peter W. Billings, A Comparative 
Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative Systems for Determining Asylum 
Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 273–80, 296-97 (2000). 
 267.  See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and 
Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ¶ 189 et 
seq. (reissued Dec. 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (hereinafter “U.N. Refugee Handbook”). 
 268.  Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 
AKRON L. REV. 647 (2012). 
 269.  Id. at 709 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635, 1701 (2010). 
 270.  See Anker, supra note 216, at 489–95. 
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do little more than “spray pepper” in the eyes of the judges.271 
Professor Kidane’s third point centers on fairness.  Citing 
Refugee Roulette and other sources, he contends that the 
“overwhelming majority” of respondents in removal 
proceedings are unrepresented.272  In fact, EOIR statistics 
show that the percentage of unrepresented respondents has 
fallen over the past four years, from 60% in 2010 to 45% in 
2014.273  Nonetheless, Professor Kidane’s point is important: 
an adversarial hearing is “fair” only when both sides have a 
comparable arsenal of legal “weapons.” But in immigration 
court, the table is tilted very heavily in the Government’s 
favor.  The problem is compounded by the awkward position 
of immigration judges, who frequently cross-examine 
witnesses themselves.274  Thus, an unrepresented applicant 
may feel he or she is confronted by two government 
lawyers.275  Professor Kidane’s final point in favor of a non-
adversarial model is simply that a fair, efficient, and less 
expensive system would be more acceptable politically.276 
Professor Kidane’s points apply with great force to the 
adjudication of asylum claims filed by trauma survivors.  For 
the reasons discussed earlier, a system that relies on the 
adversarial cross-examination of trauma survivors is destined 
to be both grossly inaccurate and fundamentally unfair.  As a 
study conducted by Deborah Anker emphasized, the cross-
examination of asylum applicants by Government lawyers 
tends to focus on credibility and character rather than 
substance.  Observers noted that the manner of trial 
attorneys was often “hostile, sarcastic, and disbelieving,” and 
 
 271.  Kidane, supra note 268, at 710–11.  After working for three years as an 
INS trial attorney, I can attest to the fact that Prof. Kidane has accurately 
described the way many of my former colleagues approached their work. 
 272.  Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15. 
 273.  EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at F1. 
 274.  Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15 (citing Deborah E. Anker, 
Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 489–90 (1992)).  After observing nearly 
200 deportation cases, Prof. Anker concluded that judges often did not appear to 
be neutral. In her words: “Instead of an independent adjudicator and an 
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two, 
instead of one, opposing counsels.” Anker at 489. 
 275.  Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15. 
 276.  Kidane, supra note 268, at 716.  The truth of that claim, of course, 
assumes the political beliefs of most citizens and politicians are rational. 
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they concluded that the often-extensive cross-examination 
added very little to the effective resolution of a case.277  In 
such circumstances, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
government trial lawyers rarely do more than “throw pepper” 
in the judge’s eyes.  Paying them to do so at taxpayer expense 
is inordinately wasteful and inefficient.  Still, it is difficult to 
imagine Congressional support for an entirely non-
adversarial immigration system, especially when, as in recent 
years, the Government’s focus has been on the deportation of 
non-citizens who have a criminal conviction, however 
minor.278 
B. The Non-Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for 
Asylum 
If the United States is genuinely committed to the fair, 
accurate, and efficient adjudication of claims for asylum, the 
existing adversarial system should be abandoned.  And in the 
absence of a fully inquisitorial immigration court, the only 
way to accomplish that result would be to remove the 
adjudication of asylum claims entirely from the existing 
immigration court system. 
Thus, the existing two-tiered system of informal 
interviews with asylum officers and adversarial hearings in 
immigration court should be replaced with a single 
adjudication, one that is relatively formal, non-adversarial, 
and separate from the immigration courts.  In contrast to 
immigration court hearings, the hearing officer should 
conduct the questioning instead of a government lawyer.  In 
the great majority of cases, the government should not (and 
need not) be represented, and prior versions of the applicant’s 
story should not be considered.  Exceptions to these last two 
points could be made in compelling circumstances: for 
instance, if there are serious reasons to believe the applicant 
assisted in the persecution of others or was involved in 
terrorism or other serious criminal activity.  Within this 
framework, further details should be left to discussions 
 
 277.  Anker, supra note 216, at 49–95. 
 278.  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Report Finds Deportations Focus on Criminal 
Records, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 29, 2014), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/report-finds-deportations-focus-on-criminal-
records.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
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between government officials, immigration advocates, and 
experts on psychological trauma. 
There are two ways by which a non-adversarial system 
could be implemented.  The easier approach would be to 
expand the existing network of asylum offices, and to 
adjudicate all claims for asylum there.  For applicants who 
file an asylum claim after a removal case has begun, removal 
proceedings could be continued pending a separate 
assessment of their eligibility for asylum,279 and the removal 
case could then be terminated if asylum is granted.  Certain 
changes to the asylum offices would be needed.  Officers and 
staff should be added, professional interpreters should be 
hired, and a formal record (including a transcript) should be 
created.  But all of these changes could almost certainly be 
made through executive action, without the involvement of 
Congress. 
The potential downside of that approach, as Professor 
Legomsky suggests, is that any adjudication conducted within 
existing federal agencies may be subject to both budgetary 
and political pressures.280  The alternative, then, would be to 
create an entirely new administrative tribunal, one 
independent from both the Justice Department and the 
Department of Homeland Security.  In that scenario, the 
existing asylum offices would be eliminated, and personnel 
could be shifted to the new tribunal.  In contrast to the first 
approach, however, an independent tribunal could be created 
only through an act of Congress. 
Any move to a purely non-adversarial system for 
adjudicating asylum claims need not be prohibitively 
expensive.  The workload of the immigration courts would be 
diminished by more than half,281 and new positions could be 
 
 279.  An immigration judge has discretion to postpone removal proceedings 
for good cause on the motion of either party.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.6. 
 280.  Prof. Legomsky makes the same point at length when he argues for a 
new immigration tribunal outside the Department of Justice.  See Legomsky, 
supra note 258, at 1665–1671. 
 281.  The remaining system would still decide, among other things, whether 
aliens are subject to removal from the United States, and whether they are 
eligible for other forms of relief from removal such as adjustment of status, 
cancellation of removal, or the relief provided under INA section 212(c) to 
certain immigrants convicted of a crime.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (authorizing the 
cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) & 
(h)  (authorizing the discretionary waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility 
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filled by drawing qualified personnel from the ranks of 
immigration judges and the corps of lawyers who now 
represent the government in immigration court.  And if the 
Board of Immigration Appeals were eliminated—as Professor 
Legomsky recommends—personnel could also be drawn from 
the ranks of government lawyers who now work for the BIA. 
In either scenario, the end result would be an 
adjudication system that is more efficient, better staffed, 
more consistent with U.N. recommendations and the refugee 
adjudication practices in other countries, and more responsive 
to both the spirit of refugee law and the challenges faced by 
trauma survivors who seek asylum. 
C. Other Trauma-Related Reforms 
Implementing the proposed reforms will require time, 
money, and substantial political will.  In the long run, it may 
never happen. In the short run, important changes could 
easily be made to the existing adjudication process.  Most 
notably, key participants in process should be thoroughly 
trained in the nature and symptoms of trauma, and the 
effects of trauma on the ways in which survivors tell their 
stories.  In addition, the claims of trauma survivors could be 
adjudicated more fairly if small changes were made to 
immigration statutes. 
On most fronts, existing training is inadequate or 
nonexistent.  For instance, the section of EOIR’s Immigration 
Judge Benchbook dealing with “mental health issues” 
includes an extensive discussion of issues relating to 
competence, but no discussion at all on the effects of 
trauma.282  The section of the Benchbook dealing with 
evidence and testimony is likewise silent on the challenges 
faced by trauma survivors.283  The guidance and training 
given to Government lawyers is not available online, but 
 
for specified persons); 8 CFR § 1245.2(a)(1)(i)  (granting immigration judges 
exclusive jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status filed by persons 
in removal proceedings). 
 282.  EOIR, Immigration Judge Benchbook, Mental Health Issues, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-mental-health-
issues (last visted June 15, 2015). 
 283.  EOIR, Immigration Judge Benchbook, Evidence, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Evidence_Guide.
pdf (last visited June 15, 2015). 
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given their behavior and practices, there is every reason to 
think that they are not trained well—if at all—in the 
symptoms of trauma and the challenges faced by trauma 
survivors. 
Unfortunately, the same shortcomings are typically true 
for materials aimed at lawyers who represent asylum seekers.  
For instance, a book-length “Asylum Primer” published by the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association includes a 
detailed appendix with advice on preparing and presenting a 
claim.  That appendix says virtually nothing about trauma, 
beyond noting that “[i]ndividuals who have experienced or 
witnessed traumatic events may have difficulty 
remembering.”284 
A manual on “Winning Asylum Cases” published by the 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center is more helpful but still 
falls short of giving a full account of the challenges presented 
by trauma survivors who seek asylum.  After noting that 
PTSD is “perhaps the most common mental condition suffered 
by victims of torture,”285 the manual explains that trauma 
survivors may block out all or part of a traumatic event, and 
may display “inappropriate behavior” during a hearing, such 
as a “tendency to relate horrifying events in a flat, 
emotionless voice.”286  These concerns, the manual cautions, 
may affect an attorney’s ability to prepare, the applicant’s 
ability to recall events, and “the judge’s likelihood of reaching 
a favorable decision.287 
The manual goes on to recommend that attorneys who 
represent asylum applicants should meet with their client at 
least twice before a hearing,288 and should consider obtaining 
an assessment and testimony from a mental health expert if 
the client exhibits symptoms of trauma.289  The manual’s 
treatment of the subject is accurate as far as it goes, but it 
falls far short of giving practicing lawyers a full 
understanding of the effects of trauma, the challenges faced 
 
 284.  REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 353 (Am. Immigration 
Lawyer’s Assoc. 4th ed. 2005). 
 285.  ROBERT JOBE, et al., WINNING ASYLUM CASES §§ 13–20 (Immigrant 
Legal Resource Center 2004). 
 286.  Id. at §§ 13–21. 
 287.  Id. at §§13–21. 
 288.  Id. at §§ 13–23. 
 289.  Id. at §§ 13–21. 
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by survivors who seek asylum, the impact of the attorney’s 
work on a survivor’s ability to tell her story, and the ways an 
attorney might inadvertently introduce discrepancies into the 
record of proceedings.  And this manual, of course, is simply a 
manual, one that most immigration lawyers undoubtedly 
have not read.  Any person licensed to practice law may 
represent an asylum seeker; there is no mandatory training 
for those who wish to do so. 
Unfortunately, manuals for lawyers who work with 
trauma survivors in other situations are often of no greater 
help.  For instance, the National Center on Domestic 
Violence, Trauma and Mental Health has created a detailed, 
sixty-seven page handbook for attorneys who represent 
domestic violence survivors.290  The advice in that handbook 
is thorough and sound, but it devotes only six pages to the 
process of interviewing the survivor and preparing her for 
court, and it does not discuss in detail the impact of trauma 
on a survivor’s ability to tell a consistent, “credible” story.291 
Perhaps most remarkable, even the UNHCR’s “Handbook 
and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status” is silent on the issue.  There are sections 
dealing with “mentally disturbed persons” and 
unaccompanied minors, 292 but there is no discussion of 
psychological trauma or post-traumatic distress disorder. 
The Asylum Division of USCIS is the lone exception to 
this pervasive lack of training on the ways that may trauma 
effect a litigant’s testimony.  As part of their five-week “basic 
training,” asylum officers complete a unit on “interviewing 
survivors.”  The twenty-page lesson plan for this unit is 
thorough and detailed.293  Among other things,294 it covers the 
nature of torture and other types of trauma; the physical and 
 
 290.  Mary Malefyt Seighman, et al., Representing Domestic Violence 
Survivors Who Are Experiencing Trauma And Other Mental Health Challenges 
(December 2011), available at http://csaj.org/document-library/mental_health
.pdf (last visited July 15, 2015) (hereinafter “Representing Survivors”). 
 291.  Id. at 5–8, 41–44. Other topics discussed in the handbook include client 
counseling (8 pages); discovery and evidence (10 pages); custody and mental 
health evaluations (10 pages); and working with expert witnesses (6 pages). 
 292.  U.N. Refugee Handbook, supra note 267, ¶¶ 206–219. 
 293.  USCIS, Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, Asylum Officer 
Basic Training Course, Interviewing Part 5: Interviewing Survivors (hereinafter 
“AO Training: Interviewing Survivors”). 
 294.  See id. at 4 (table of contents). 
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psychological effects of trauma; the process of recovery; the 
ways in which trauma can “inhibit applicants from fully 
expressing an asylum claim”;295 and suggested techniques for 
interviewing survivors.  The lesson plan emphasizes that an 
interview may trigger intrusive flashbacks or other symptoms 
of PTSD, and that survivors may avoid discussing certain 
events, have difficulty remembering events, be confused 
about details, lose composure, avoid eye contact, be 
unresponsive, or have difficulty following questions or 
answering coherently.296  The training urges officers to “treat 
the applicant with humanity,” and provides suggestions on 
ways to “be thorough but sensitive” and “help the person feel 
safe and in control.”297 
All of this is commendable, but the training falls short on 
one critical point: it fails to emphasize that discrepancies in 
an applicant’s story may be evidence of psychological trauma 
rather than untruthfulness.  The training simply stresses 
instead that a survivor may respond in different ways “when 
confronted with discrepancies in his or her story.”298  A 
separate lesson on “decision writing” emphasizes that officers 
must make an assessment of the applicant’s credibility, and 
in doing so must note any material “discrepancies, 
inconsistencies, or lack of details in the applicant’s claim.”299  
But that lesson does not advise officers on the conclusions 
they can properly draw from inconsistencies.  Unless they are 
introduced as evidence in a removal case, the decisions of 
asylum officers are not public.  Thus, it is impossible to assess 
how well officers apply the advice they are given, and the 
extent to which their negative credibility findings may be 
based on inconsistencies in an applicant’s story.300 
 
 295.  Id. at 6. 
 296.  Id. at 16–19. 
 297.  Id. at 19–22. 
 298.  Id. at 22. 
 299.  AO Training: Decision Writing Part I at 10. 
 300.  An article by mental health professionals who work with torture 
survivors provides an antidote that may be typical.  During an asylum 
interview, a Guatamalan applicant testified that she had been raped.  Because 
she did not mention the rape in her declaration, the asylum officer referred her 
case to an immigration court.  During the immigration court hearing, however, 
she presented expert testimony concerning the symptoms of PTSD, and an 
immigration judge granted her application.  See Gangshei & Deutsch, supra 
note 20, at 82. 
01 PASKEY FINAL 5/18/2016  3:49 PM 
520 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The need for improved training of immigration judges, 
attorneys, and asylum officers is clear and compelling.  In 
conjunction with that training, Congress should also revise 
the standards for credibility assessment to make it clear that 
immigration judges must consider the consequences of 
psychological trauma and the possibility that any perceived 
problems with the applicant’s testimony are the result of 
trauma rather than untruthfulness.  But even if the law is 
not changed, judges can and should consider those issues: as 
now framed, the statute permits judges to consider “all 
relevant factors,” and the possible effects of trauma are 
indisputably relevant. 
In addition to better training, the adjudication of claims 
involving survivors would benefit from modest amendments 
to asylum-related statutes.  Under existing law, an asylum 
application must be filed within one year after an applicant’s 
arrival in the United States unless the applicant 
demonstrates either “changed circumstances” that materially 
affect the applicant’s eligibility or “extraordinary 
circumstances” related to the delay in filing.301  In addition, 
the standards for credibility make no reference to the effects 
of trauma on an applicant’s ability to present her case.302  The 
statute should be amended to expressly recognize that 
psychological trauma is an “extraordinary circumstance,” and 
should further direct that possible effects of trauma must be 
taken into account when an applicant’s credibility is 
considered. 
Finally, just as the Government now funds and 
maintains a Forensic Document Laboratory to review 
questioned documents in immigration cases,303 Congress 
should consider providing psychological evaluations for 
indigent asylum seekers who exhibit symptoms of trauma.  
Doing so would benefit not only the asylum seekers 
themselves, but also the accuracy and integrity of the 
adjudication process.304 
 
 301.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). 
 302.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 303.  See Department of Homeland Security, Forensic Document Lab (ICE), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/external/forensic-document-lab-ice (last visited 
July 15, 2015). 
 304.  For a detailed discussion of the benefits of psychological evaluation in 
this context, see generally Gangshei & Deutsch, supra note 20. 
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D. Potential Objections and Other Comments 
The most vocal objections to any changes, of course, will 
come from those who are deeply—and rightly—concerned 
about fraudulent claims for asylum. Accurate statistics on 
fraud would be impossible to compile, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests the problem is serious.  Over the past several 
decades, there have been repeated instances in which 
immigration officials have broken up criminal schemes to 
perpetuate asylum fraud, some of them involving 
immigration lawyers.305 
Nonetheless, the possibility of fraud should not deter the 
proposed changes.  The existing system’s primary check on 
fraud consists of adversarial cross-examination, but without 
evidence to contradict an applicant’s testimony, that strategy 
is inaccurate and ineffective.  By substantially reducing the 
waste in the current system, resources and personnel could be 
devoted to the factual investigation of key facts in many 
cases. 
An example from my own experience illustrates the 
possibilities.  An asylum applicant from the Ivory Coast 
testified she was a founding member of an opposition political 
party and helped organize the party’s first public 
demonstration, during which police killed six party members.  
The applicant was adamant that this demonstration took 
place in the city of Abidjan.  In fact, reports from the media 
and human rights groups proved the demonstration took 
place in a different city more than 200 miles away—a city the 
applicant had never visited.  Given their current workload, 
government lawyers rarely have time to search for this sort of 
evidence, but a streamlined process would allow for a more 
thorough investigation of the facts underlying many cases, 
and any evidence found could be provided to an asylum officer 
without a formal appearance by government counsel. 
 
 305.  See, e.g., Maryland lawyer convicted in asylum scheme, AP Alert – DC 
Daybook (Feb. 12, 2009); Five guilty in immigration asylum scam, UPI 
Newstrack (June 29, 2009); Lawyer charged in smuggling case: U.S. plans to 
review status of thousands of Chinese immigrants, Dallas Morning News 6A 
(Sept. 21, 2000). For a detailed account of the challenges faced by immigrants 
caught up in these schemes, see Frances Robles, Tamils’ Smuggling Journey to 
U.S. Leads to Longer Ordeal: 3 Years of Detention, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/us/tamils-smuggling-journey-to-us-leads-to-
longer-ordeal-3-years-of-detention.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
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There is a second and more compelling reason why 
concerns about fraud should not deter the shift to a non-
adversarial system of adjudication.  If a legitimate refugee is 
denied asylum, the stakes are enormous: the applicant’s 
safety and life may literally be in danger.  On the other hand, 
the stakes are minimal in most cases involving fraud: the 
government—and society at large—would lose little if asylum 
is incorrectly granted to someone who is not a refugee.  In 
cases where the stakes are higher—for instance, if there is 
reason to think an applicant has been involved in terrorism, 
the persecution of others, or serious criminal activity—the 
procedures could easily allow for government lawyers to 
participate in hearings, present evidence, and cross-examine 
the applicant. 
CONCLUSION 
The shortcomings of our current asylum procedures have 
been decades in the making.  In the Refugee Act of 1980, 
Congress enacted sweeping changes to U.S. refugee laws.  As 
Sen. Edward Kennedy (the lead sponsor) explained, the 
changes were intended to “reform the discriminatory and 
outdated refugee provisions” then in place, and to “insure 
greater equity in our treatment of refugees.”306  But at that 
time, the dynamics of psychological trauma were not yet well 
understood, and the procedures envisioned by the Refugee 
Act’s sponsors did not account for the needs of trauma 
survivors.  Later amendments to the law—most notably the 
statutory provisions related to credibility and corroboration—
have made matters worse, not better. 
Beneath the laws themselves are deep 
misunderstandings about the character of “true” stories, the 
truthfulness of storytellers, and the supposed power of cross-
examination to distinguish between truth and falsehood.  For 
trauma survivors, the system remains both discriminatory 
and outdated, and the Refugee Act’s full promise cannot be 
met without further reform. 
Some might suggest that it would be enough to provide 
better training for everyone involved in the process, and that 
further changes are unnecessary.  To do so would be an 
 
 306.  125 Cong. Rec. S2630 (daily ed. March 13, 1979) (statement of Edward 
Kennedy). 
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improvement over the current state of affairs, but it would 
leave the United States with an expensive, unwieldy system 
that remains ill-equipped to assess the credibility of the 
asylum applicants who are most vulnerable and most in need 
of the safety that asylum offers. 
Adversarial systems of adjudication are grounded in the 
premise that the “truth” benefits from a contest of wills in 
which competing sides present evidence and “test” the 
evidence offered by the other side.  But when the witness is a 
trauma survivor, adversarial cross-examination is not an 
“engine of truth,” but rather a cudgel by which both the 
witness and the truth are likely to be beaten and broken. 
Isak Dinesen once suggested that “[a]ll sorrows can be 
borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about 
them.”307  But for trauma survivors, simply telling the story is 
not enough: others must believe the story to be true.  This 
Article is intended to point the way forward, from the broken 
procedures that now exist toward a more humane system for 
adjudicating asylum claims. 
  
 
 307.  Those words were attributed to Dineson by Hannah Arendt, but Arendt 
provided no source.  See Lynn R. Wilkinson, Hannah Arendt on Isak Dinesen: 
Between Storytelling and Theory, 56 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE 77, 77 (Winter 
2004). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Federal Appellate Decisions that Review a Negative 
Credibility Finding in an Asylum Case: 2010 
 
For this study, researchers examined 369 decisions* 
issued by the Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2010. Each of these 
cases reviewed an immigration judge’s negative credibility 
finding in an asylum case. Table 1 breaks down those cases 
by circuit, and includes both the raw number of cases 
remanded in each circuit and the percentage of cases 
affirmed. Of the 369 cases, 15 were remanded, and the 
remaining 354 cases were affirmed. 
 
Circuit Number 
of Cases 
Cases 
Remanded 
Percentage 
Affirmed 
First Circuit 4 0 100.0% 
Second Circuit 130 1 99.2% 
Third Circuit 55 0 100.0% 
Forth Circuit 2 0 100.0% 
Fifth Circuit 14 0 100.0% 
Sixth Circuit 24 0 100.0% 
Seventh 
Circuit 
6 0 100.0% 
Eighth Circuit 7 0 100.0% 
Ninth Circuit 84 12 85.7% 
Tenth Circuit 3 0 100.0% 
Eleventh 
Circuit 
40 2 95.0% 
Total 369 15 95.9% 
 
 
  
 
* An additional 44 cases were reviewed but were not included because the 
decision does not clearly identify grounds for the negative credibility finding. 
Also, cases involving a single appellate decision for two or more family members 
with related claims were treated as a single case. 
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TABLE 2 
Factors Identified By Immigration Judges As Support for 
a Negative Credibility Finding 
 
In most cases, judges listed two to four factors in support 
of the negative credibility finding. For the 369 cases reviewed, 
Table 2 lists the number of decisions that mention each of 
various factors. The first category listed includes 
inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony at the asylum 
hearing, as well as inconsistencies between the testimony and 
the applicant’s prior statements. This category is broken 
down further in Table 3. 
 
Applicant’s story was inconsistent 318 (86.2%) 
Other aspects of testimony (vague, 
implausible, etc.)   
84 (22.8%) 
Applicant’s demeanor  65 (17.6%) 
Applicant’s story was inconsistent with other 
evidence   
171 (46.3%) 
Applicant failed to corroborate story 158 (42.8%) 
All other factors 36 (9.8%) 
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TABLE 3 
Breakdown of Decisions That Relied on Inconsistencies in 
the Applicant’s Story 
 
As noted above, 318 of the 369 cases (86.2%) relied on one 
or more inconsistencies in the applicant’s story as grounds for 
a negative credibility finding. Table 3 breaks that group down 
further into combinations of three distinct types of 
inconsistency. 
 
The testimony was: 
 
 Number Percentage of 
All Cases 
(A)Internally inconsistent 172 46.6% 
(B) Inconsistent with the 
declaration 
210 56.9% 
(C) Inconsistent with other 
prior statements 
104 28.2% 
 
(A) only 67 
(B) only 81 
(C) only 26 
(A) + (B) 77 
(A) + (C) 15 
(B) + (C) 39 
(A) + (B) + (C) 24 
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TABLE 4 
Breakdown of Cases that Relied on Inconsistencies 
between the Testimony and Other Prior Statements as 
Grounds for a Negative Credibility Finding 
 
In 104 cases (28.2% of the total) the immigration judge 
relied on inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony 
and the applicant’s prior statements other than a written 
declaration. Table 4 breaks this down to separate out the 
cases in which the judge relied on a record of the applicant’s 
statements during an asylum interview. 
 
Total cases 104 
Testimony inconsistent with asylum 
interview only 
39 
Testimony inconsistent with other prior 
statements 
51 
Testimony inconsistent with both asylum 
interview and other statements 
14 
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TABLE 5 
Breakdown of Factors Considered in Cases for Which the 
Applicant’s Story Was Not Inconsistent 
 
In 51 cases (13.3% of the total), the immigration judge 
did not mention inconsistencies in the applicant’s story, but 
nonetheless found the applicant not credible for other 
reasons. Table 5 identifies the factors the immigration judge 
relied on in these cases. 
 
 Number 
(A) Story was inconsistent 
with other evidence   
44 
(B) Applicant failed to 
corrorborate testimony 
21 
(C) All other factors, 
including demeanor  
13 
 
(A) only 22 
(B) only 4 
(C) only 1 
(A) + (B) 7 
(A) + (C) 5 
(B) + (C) 2 
(A) + (B) + (C) 10 
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TABLE 6 
Cases that Combine External Factors with Inconsistencies 
in the Applicant’s Story 
 
As noted above, in most cases immigration judges relied 
on two to four factors to support a negative credibility finding. 
Table 6 lists five factors that do not involve inconsistencies in 
the applicant’s story. For each of those factors, the table 
demonstrates that judges rarely relied on such factors alone. 
Instead, these factors were usually combined with an 
inconsistency in the applicant’s story. 
 
(A)  Applicant’s story inconsistent with 
other   
evidence 
 
 Applicant’s story was also internally   
inconsistent 
171 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
 
 
70.2% 
(B)  Applicant failed to corroborate 
story   
  
 Applicant’s story was also internally   
 inconsistent 
158 
 
 
135 
 
 
 
85.4% 
(C)  Demeanor  
 
 Applicant’s story was also internally 
 inconsistent 
65 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
87.7% 
(D)  Other aspects of testimony (vague,  
implausible, etc.)  
 
 Applicant’s story was also internally   
 inconsistent 
84 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
 
 
86.9% 
(E)  Other grounds for negative 
credibility   
 finding  
 
 Applicant’s story was also internally   
 inconsistent 
36 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
94.1% 
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TABLE 7 
Factors Considered in Conjunction with Inconsistencies 
Between the Applicant’s Testimony and the Written 
Declaration 
 
As noted above, in 210 cases (56.9% of the total) an 
immigration judge relied on inconsistencies between the 
applicant’s testimony and a written declaration prepared by 
the applicant’s lawyer. In most of those cases, the judge also 
relied on other factors. Table 7 identifies the number of times 
each of these other factors was relied on. 
 
Inconsistency between testimony and declaration 
only 
21 
Testimony itself was also inconsistent 90 
Testimony was inconsistent with other prior 
statements 
63 
Applicant’s demeanor 31 
Also other aspects of testimony (vague, 
implausible, etc.) 
51 
Testimony was inconsistent with other evidence 79 
Applicant failed to corroborate testimony 81 
Also other factors 23 
 
 
TABLE 8 
The Number of Factors Cited In Each Decision 
 
Factors Cases 
1 64 
2 95 
3 122 
4 62 
5 17 
6 7 
7 1 
8 1 
 
 
